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Chapter 1
Overview of the Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI)
Since U.S. President George W. Bush declared it in Krakow, Poland on May
31, 2003, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) concept has consistently remained
1

the same. Beginning with eleven like-minded states, this U.S.-led initiative has grown
into a collective initiative 2 comprised of ninety-eight states worldwide. 3 The original
members that committed to the PSI were the United States, Australia, France,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, Japan,
and Singapore. The initiative, which stems from the 2002 U.S. National Strategy to
Combat WMD Proliferation, is a response to curb the growing challenges posed by the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and
related materials. 4
The PSI is an international arrangement composed of states with a common
objective to stop the illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by nonstate or state actors. The international arrangement follows principles conveyed in the
PSI statement of interdiction agreed to by the PSI participants. In practice, the PSI
unilaterally interdicts, in the context of this dissertation, any ship suspected of carrying
not only elements but also technology related to WMD. In so doing, those following
the PSI may use force if deemed necessary. In fact, some of the past PSI interdiction

I

See CRAIG H. ALLEN, MARITIME COUNTER PROLIFERATION OPERATIONS AND THE RULE OF

LA w (2007) ( discussing the evolution of the PSI).
Erin E. Harbaugh, The Proliferation Security Initiatives: Counterproliferation at the
Crossroads, 7 STRATEGIC INSIGHTS 2 (2004).
3
Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, Remarks by the President to the
People of Poland (May 31, 2003 ), available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/2003053 l-3.html.
4
President George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive No. 17 (Dec. 2002),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1 7 .html.
2

1

activities have involved the use of force in acquiring control over foreign ships. PSI
maritime interdiction covers areas from territorial seas to the high seas.
The PSI statement of inter~iction principles serves as the blueprint for PSI
activities and identifies concrete steps to facilitate effective interdiction of WMD.
Under President Obama, the U.S. government has affirmed and strengthened the PSI,
evidenced by Obama's speech in Prague in April 2009, as well as by such U.S. policy
documents as the White House's National Security Strategy and the Pentagon's last
Quadrennial Defense Review. 5 International measures and the campaign to invite
states to join the PSI have been intensive, if not extensive. Among the recent
international measures that were deemed to be in favor of the PSI, are the conclusion
of the 2010 Ship-Boarding Agreement between the governments of the United States
and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,6 and the entry into force in 2010 of the 2005
SUA Protocol, 7 which criminalizes transfer of WMD. Bilateral requests for other
countries to join the PSI are also taking place, the latest during a bilateral meeting
between U.S. Secretary of State Clinton and Indonesian Foreign Minister Natalegawa
during the 2011 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings. The U.S.
government also invites states to participate in PSI meetings to provide their views and
correct any misunderstanding of the PSI.
5

U.S. Dep't of State, Proliferation Security Initiative, available at http://www.state.gov/t/
isn/cl0390.htm; see also STANLEY A. RENSHON, NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION: REASSESSING THE BUSH DOCTRINE 167 (2010) (discussing why terrorism
remains a clear threat to U.S. national security).
6
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials by Sea, May
11, 2010, KAY 8951 [hereinafter SBA St. Vincent and the Grenadines].
7
Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Maritime Navigation, May 9, 2005, IMO Doc. LEG 90/25, KA V 8049 [hereinafter 2005
SUA Protocol].
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international law: the documents (the PSI statement of interdiction, ship-boarding
agreements, declaration in support of PSI) or the practice (the PSI maritime
interdiction, conclusion of similar international conventions) or a combination of the
former and the latter. In doing so, this dissertation will analyze PSI documents under
selected regimes of international law, compare PSI maritime interdiction with other
maritime interdiction recognized under international law, and frame the PSI elements
under the sources of international law as enshrined in Article 38 of the International
Court of Justice (I.CJ.) Statute, all of which are reflected in the following chapters.

Aims and Scope
This dissertation will show that PSI maritime interdiction has transformed into
a norm under international law, particularly for the PSI-participating states. It argues
that PSI as an international arrangement has legal characteristics that give rise to
international rights and obligations. For PSI-participating states, the characteristics set
forth guidelines for enforcing their shared commitments. Among other items, it
prescribes rules on the limited use of force, the requirement of flag-state consent, and
an avenue for compensation for conducting maritime interdiction to stop illicit
trafficking of WMD. All of these rules are consistent with prevailing rules of
international law, enshrined primarily in UNCLOS.
This dissertation limits its scope only PSI measures at sea, i.e. maritime
interdiction. The reason behind the limitation of the scope is to set boundary and
provide detailed discussion on PSI maritime interdiction. In addition, the fact that
transportation of goods worldwide is carried out primarily at sea contributes to the

7

limitation of the scope. Furthermore, statistically the numbers of PSI measures
conducted at sea is higher compared to that in air and land.
Analysis in this dissertation will cover a review of regimes of international
law, particularly international law of the sea affected by PSI. Specific regimes of
international law discussed are sovereignty, freedom of navigation, combating
terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, and use of force. The dissertation argues that PSI
does not contradict the aforementioned specific regimes of international law.
Similarly, under comparative analysis, this dissertation contends that PSI
maritime interdiction shares common characteristics with other maritime interdictions
recognized by international law, such as piracy, fisheries, drug trafficking, and human
trafficking. The analysis will compare the PSI statement of interdiction with UN CLOS
and other international conventions that govern maritime interdiction.
With regard to the status of PSI under international law, the dissertation will
focus on framing the PSI within sources of international law governed by Article 38 of
the I.CJ. Statute. Attention will be given to first and second sources of international
law, which are international treaty law and customary international law. The
dissertation holds that PSI as an international arrangement creates legal obligations for
its participating states and to a certain extent non-participating states.
This dissertation research was conducted using a qualitative approach by first
focusing on primary sources of law, especially UN CLOS. The use of other
international instruments is selective on a case-by-case basis. The dissertation also
applies an I.C.J. framework of sources of international law. It will frequently make
direct quotations from relevant I.C.J. cases, UNCLOS, and other selected international
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instruments. In addition, the dissertation will refer to secondary sources only if
primary sources are not sufficient.
Overview of Chapters
This dissertation consists of six chapters. Two chapters provide the
introduction and conclusion while the remaining four chapters serve as substantive
chapters. The first chapter introduces the topic of the dissertation: PSI. It discusses the
background of PSI, argumentation in support of PSI, and limitations of analysis. The
second chapter includes an overview of PSI, with analysis of the PSI statement of
interdiction principles, ship-boarding agreements, and PSI membership. In addition, it
includes analysis of PSI programs and activities and selected countries' views on PSI.
In the third chapter, the dissertation argues that PSI is consistent with
international law. Discussions of relevant regimes of international law cover
sovereignty, freedom of navigation, combating terrorism, the proliferation of WMD,
and the use of force. It posits that the PSI motive complements existing regimes
addressing terrorism and WMD that are recognized under international law. It further
contends that PSI methods do not contradict freedom of navigation and that its limited
use of force is permissible under international law.
The fourth chapter includes discussion that is organized in a comparative
scheme. It compares PSI maritime interdiction with maritime interdiction recognized
under international law. For classification purposes, the comparison divides the latter
into UNCLOS-based maritime interdiction and maritime interdiction based on other
international instruments.

9

The fifth chapter investigates the status of PSI under international law. It holds
that PSI as an international arrangement creates legal obligations for its participating
states. The public declaration of commitment to PSI is a legal characteristic that gives
rise to international obligations. PSI also meets treaty and customary international law
requirements as indicated by a framework of sources of international law. As a
unilateral act, PSI constitutes state practice and opinio Juris is reflected in the
declaration supporting PSI. Finally, the sixth chapter includes the conclusion and
summary.

10

Chapter 2
Analysis of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
The PSI is developing into a norm in international law. The following analysis
will discuss the PSI documents, namely the PSI statement of interdiction, declaration
in support of the PSI, and ship-boarding agreements. In addition, this chapter will also
discuss selected countries' views representing proponents and opponents of the PSI.

Statement of Interdiction
For purposes of this analysis, the PSI statement of interdiction is treated as an
international legal instrument that all of its participants are committed to follow. It has
legal character in the sense that it creates a legal obligation that all participants are
expected to meet when they join the initiative. 21 The PSI statement of interdiction also
meets the treaty qualifications of the 1969 Vienna Law of Treaties; 22 that is, it is
entered into by states in written format and governed by international law. PSI
participants are states that make public declarations of commitment; the PSI statement
of interdiction is in written format; and the PSI is claimed to be consistent with
national legal authorities and international law. Thus, because the PSI shares primary
elements of a treaty, its interpretation should follow the customary rule of
interpretation recognized under international law as encapsulated in Article 31 of the
1969 Vienna Law of Treaties, that is, a subjective, literal, and theological approach
showing no preference or hierarchal manner. In other words, the interpretation covers
the three approaches holistically. Subjective refers to the intention of the parties, literal
21

See Chapter 3, "PSI and International Law," infra, for discussion of the legal character of
the PSI statement of interdiction.
22
Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, art. 2(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter 1969 Vienna Law of Treaties]).

refers to the ordinary meaning of the words, and theological refers to analysis of the
object and purpose of an instrument in question. 23

Chapeau. Participants in the PSI have voluntarily agreed to four principles:
undertaking effective measures, adopting streamlined procedures, strengthening
national legal authorities, and taking specific actions. 24 The chapeau serves as a
general condition:
PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to
establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and
stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to
and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with
national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks,
including the U.N. Security Council. They call on all states concerned with this
threat to international peace and security to join in similarly committing to [the
following principles ]. 25
By theological interpretation, the chapeau is relatively clear. Similar to other
international legal instruments, the chapeau acts as a preamble to the PSI statement of
interdiction. It generally describes the object and purpose of the PSI. The object is to
impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials from
state and non-state actors of proliferation concern, while the purpose is to fight
proliferation of WMD, which participants consider a threat to international peace and
security. While making no specific reference to any international legal instruments, the
chapeau does recognize the role of international law in the PSI.

23

SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 42 (1995); see also EDWARD SLAVKO YAMBRUSIC, TREATY INTERPRETATION:
THEORY AND REALITY (1987); GYORGY HARAZASTI, SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF
THE LAW OF TREATIES ( 1973); Anthony A. D' Amato, Trashing Customary International
Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 101, I 01-05 (1987). A similar concern about the history of codifying
rules of interpretation is also discussed in TI y ANG CHANG, THE INTERPRETATION OF
TREATIES BY JUDICIAL TRIBUNAL (1932).
24
PSI statement of interdiction, supra note 19.
2s

Id.

12

According to the subjective and literal approaches, however, the chapeau is not
without question. Subjective interpretation, for example, questions whether PSI
drafters intended the PSI as a follow-up measure to an international law regime,
indicating the PSI is not a stand-alone initiative, or whether PSI application must
accord with international law, suggesting it is an independent strategy. Each of these
questions has different legal perspectives; the former suggests that PSI interdiction
will always be consistent with international law because international law mandates it
while the latter indicates that PSI interdiction, as an independent strategy, may be
consistent with international law. Ramifications of these legal perspectives are also
different. For example, the former requires fewer efforts in justifying its consistency
with international law compared to the latter, which needs to balance PSI-collective
concerns with prevailing international law. It is not clear whether the drafters of the
PSI statement of interdiction intended such dual interpretations, but a valid concern is
that the PSI should be consistent with international law. The PSI drafters, however,
were aware of the notion that consistency with international law plays a significant
role in gaining international community support.
Concerning the literal interpretation, several issues require clarification, among
them whether PSI interdiction applies to all shipments of WMD irrespective of their
original purpose, or whether the PSI follows the U.N. definition of WMD as conveyed
in many U.N. conventions. Which one is the decisive element: the purpose or the
perpetrator? What if there was a shipment of WMD that came from state or non-state
actors of proliferation concern under a peaceful purpose? Another question is whether
the PSI solely determines the lists of states and non-state actors of proliferation

13

concern or whether other lists from international organizations such as the U .N. are
included. One may argue that this question could be answered by referring to the
intention of the PSI drafters concerning whether the PSI, as discussed above, is
mandated by international law. If the PSI drafters intended it as a mandate of
international law, then the list is limited to that of the U.N. or any other list that is
recognized by the international community. Otherwise, the list may refer to non-U.N.
lists, thus making it prone to abuse and arguably causing a higher degree of resistance
from the international community.
The last sentence of the chapeau referring to the threat to international peace
and security makes an interesting point. In this sentence, PSI participants consider
proliferation of WMD to be a threat to international peace and security. The chapeau
neither references nor elaborates on what constitutes a threat to international peace and
security. Even if the spread of WMD among state or non-state actors of proliferation
concern was the intended meaning of the drafters of the PSI statement of interdiction,
it still lacks internationally recognized mechanisms to address such concerns. The
international law--0r the international community for that matter-recognizes only
the U.N. Security Council as having such power and authority. 26 This point is
interesting because until 2003 no international legal instruments, but PSI made such
specific reference to proliferation of WMD. In the U.N. level, no reference occurred
until 2004, when the UNSC passed its Resolution 1540.
The last sentence of the chapeau is also the most powerful sentence in terms of
both political and seemingly legal consequences. It establishes a common ground for

26

U.N. Charter art. 51, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI [hereinafter U.N.
Charter].
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all PSI participants and its binding character, due to the similarity with the phrase
"threat to international peace and security" used by the UNSC. Less than a year after
its conception, the last sentence of the chapeau was incorporated into the most
powerful instrument recognized by international law, the United Nations Security
Council Resolution. Under UNSC Resolution 1540, dated April 28, 2004, acting under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the UNSC treats proliferation of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons as well as their means of delivery as a threat to
international peace and security. 27 Resolution 1540, however, does not refer to the PSI
as a means to address such threats.
First principle. The first principle of the PSI primarily highlights two parts:

effective measures, conveyed in the first sentence, and a brief explanation of the
phrase "states and non-state actors of proliferation concern" in the second:
Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for
interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and
related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation
concern. "States or non-state actors of proliferation concern" generally refers
to those countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish should
be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation
through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling,
receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related
materials. 28
In the first part, PSI participants may interdict WMD shipments unilaterally or in
concert with other states or non-PSI participants. Such action suggests the need for
effective coordination among not only PSI participants but also non-participants. It is
not clear, however, how far roles of non-PSI participants should extend in a PSI

S.C. Res. 1540, ,r 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004) [hereinafter UNSC Resolution
1540].
28
PSI statement of interdiction, supra note 19.
27
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interdiction, from merely intelligence exchanges to highly coordinated use of force. It
could also suggest that a state may participate on a case-by-case basis in PSI
interdiction without being a member of the PSI. If this is the case, then liability will be
an issue should a PSI interdiction result in an unexpected outcome.
The second part of the first principle is brief elaboration of "states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern." Literal interpretation indicates that the PSI is
referring to any perpetrator conducting acts of proliferation (among others, developing
or acquiring and transferring WMD) as a state or non-state actor of proliferation
concern. The rhetorical approach aside, teleological interpretation begs a question of a
situation in which the state or non-state actors concerned intend the WMD for peaceful
purposes. Currently, international law does not prohibit a state from developing a
WMD, its purpose notwithstanding. 29 Furthermore, it would be very difficult to
establish an objective and non-politically motivated list of such states and entities, let
alone publish such a list to the public.
Another issue that is apparently intertwined is the definition of weapons of

mass destruction in the description of acts of proliferation. The first definition refers
only to chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons while the second uses the phrase
WMD. One can argue that the first definition falls under the second definition; hence,
the assumption is that chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons are WMD.
Nevertheless, the fact that the PSI statement of interdiction is not clear in defining
WMD or in making any reference to an external definition of weapons of mass

destruction suggests a wider scope of definition applying not only to weapons per se

29

See David Fidler, Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Law, ASIL INSIGHTS,
Feb. 2003, available at http://www.asil.org/insigh97.cfm.
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but also to elements thereof. In the field, this condition makes it more difficult for PSI
participants to establish what constitutes a WMD, whether a large shipment of
fertilizer falls under the definition of weapon of mass destruction or whether
plutonium intended for nuclear reactors could also constitute a WMD.

Second principle. Three tasks are mentioned in the second principle: adopt
streamlined procedures, dedicate appropriate resources and efforts, and maximize
coordination:
Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information
concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential
character of classified information provided by other states as part of this
initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations
and capabilities, and maximize coordination among participants in interdiction
efforts. 30
The focus of this second principle is primarily on internal and administrative matters
among PSI participants, with the last two tasks indicating a wider scope of action in
support of interdiction operations. A literal interpretation, however, suggests that the
second principle applies only to PSI participants. In other words, non-participant states
supporting the PSI cannot take part within the scope of the second principle.
Subjective and literal methods of interpretation indicate that the PSI operates
primarily on exchange of intelligence information prior to any action of interdiction.
One may assume that the drafters of the PSI statement of interdiction are fully aware
of the significant role intelligence information plays in the success of PSI interdiction.
Time and coordination are key elements in streamlined procedures and rapid exchange
during this pre-interdiction phase. This situation suggests an element of burdensharing among PSI participants, which may require further cooperation ranging from

30

PSI statement of interdiction, supra note 19.

classification of intelligence information to the mechanism of exchange for such
information. Concerning sources of information, it can be assumed that states of nonPSI participants may also provide intelligence information to PSI participants,
although doing so could present a technical challenge because the PSI claims it has
neither secretariat nor official contacts to whom information can be sent.

Third principle. Of all the principles set out in the PSI, the third principle is
the most complex because it requires not only national but also international efforts:
Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where
necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when
necessary relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to
support these commitments. 31
At the national level, the phrase "review and strengthen" suggests that PSI participants
should coordinate not only their laws but also their enforcement efforts to support the
objectives of the PSI. One of the ways to coordinate a national law with international
commitment is by adopting the latter into the former; an extreme example in the case
of the PSI would be to define the act of shipping WMDs as a crime under a state's
law. If the PSI drafters considered national law harmonization with the PSI, then one
may assume that the PSI has an effect similar to that of an international agreement or a
treaty. In this context, the PSI creates a belief that proliferation of WMD is a criminal
act and that states have obligations to combat such a crime. The coordination of
national law with the PSI is also crucial because it sets a legal basis for local
enforcement agencies to act accordingly and to support the PSI at the international
level.

31

Id.
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Similarly, at the international level, it would be difficult for PSI participants to
work to strengthen the PSI if their national laws and policies do not support or regard
the PSI to begin with. Usually, national laws and policies reflect national interests and
then are translated into official state positions in the international arena. In the context
of the PSI, its participants are committed to supporting it at the international level,
suggesting a reflection of their national laws and policies. Among the apparent support
of the PSI at the international level is the conclusion ofUNSC Resolution 1540, which
treats proliferation of WMD as a threat to international peace and security, and the
negotiation of the 2005 SUA Protocol, which was an attempt to criminalize the
transfer of WMD at the international level. Another example supporting the PSI at the
international level is the conclusion of bilateral ship-boarding agreements among such
PSI participants as the United States and Panama.

Fourth principle. The content of the fourth principle ignites debates and
controversies with regard to its allowing such actions as the use of force with or
without consent of a relevant state:
Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of
WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national
legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under
international law and frameworks, to include:
a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or
from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to
allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.
b. At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by
another state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying
their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond
the territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of
transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of
proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.
c. To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate
circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels

19

by other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in
such vessels that may be identified by such states.
d. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal
waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels
that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from
states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such
cargoes that are identified; and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels
entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that
are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring
that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such
cargoes prior to entry.
e. At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by
another state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of
carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of
proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to land for
inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified; and/or (b)
deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit
rights through their airspace in advance of such flights.
f. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment
points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state
actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other
modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes,
and to seize such cargoes that are identified. 32
Although the object and purpose of this particular principle is parallel to the previous
principles-to take action within the boundaries of national and international lawcontextual interpretation reveals a different objective. Several commitments set out in
this principle tend to undermine or ignore other states' jurisdictions governed by the
UNCLOS. 33
The commitments range from not transporting or assisting alleged cargoes to
providing flag states' consent and seizing alleged cargoes to other actions within their
ports, as set out in paragraphs a, b, c, e, and f. Locations of these commitments, which
may take place in ships of a coastal state, ports, airfields, and other facilities, make

Id.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec.IO, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].

32
33

them fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of a coastal state recognized by international
law. Paragraph d, however, allows actions that may contradict provisions of the
UN CLOS, including freedom of navigation (innocent, transit, and archipelagic sealane passages) and use of force. For example, the first section of paragraph d lacks the
element of consent of a relevant state prior to taking any appropriate action. Such
consent is fundamental because the UNCLOS is very specific when it comes to the
consent of a flag state.
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Unless there is consent from the flag state or a valid

assumption that a passage is prejudicial, the freedom of navigation regime guarantees
passage of a foreign vessel through state territorial or archipelagic waters.
Moreover, in the second section of paragraph d, an indication of contradiction
is apparent in the phrase of "entering or leaving," which is open to multiple
interpretations because it can be loosely defined as areas beyond a territorial sea
without specific designation. In other words, at the extreme, PSI participating states
may unilaterally board and search with force foreign vessels on the high seas en route
to one state's jurisdictional waters. It is not clear whether the drafters of this particular
paragraph intended to limit the UNCLOS or to maintain a certain degree of
consistency as shown in the preceding and following paragraphs, notably a, b, c, e, and
f. Similar to the first section, the second section tends to ignore the element of consent
of a relevant flag state. As long as a foreign ship is en route or leaving a PSI
participant's jurisdictional waters, that particular ship is subject to PSI interdiction
irrespective of its actual location.
Another issue that the PSI drafters apparently took for granted in the fourth
principle or, for that matter, in the entirety of the PSI statement of interdiction, is a
34

Id. art. 92.

ship's registration. Based on subjective interpretation, the drafters of the PSI intended
to have all ships capable of carrying WMD subject to PSI interdiction. In doing so,
PSI access is exercised by means of PSI participants and ship-boarding agreements,
with major states having many ships registered in the world. One may argue that this
unilateral flag-state method of gaining access is quite effective in ensuring PSI
accessibility of all ships as compared to multilateral measures like the U.N. forum.
Nevertheless, it does not address the rather long-standing issue of flag states, the
. l'nk
genume
1
. 35
The genuine link can be problematic to PSI interdiction because it can
undermine flag states' methods of gaining access. An example of the genuine-link
issue is the bare boat chartering practiced by all states in the world. 36 Bareboat
chartering allows a state flag other than the flag of the ships' owner or registration to
be used. In bareboat chartering, three interests are involved: the charter, the flag state,
and the state of cargo origin. When a party charters a boat under the bareboat scheme,
that particular party may use its own flag during the time of the charter. This practice
does not violate the one-nationality rule 37 because the charterer bears all responsibility
when flying its own flag. Hypothetically, the charterer may avoid PSI-interdiction
access by flying a flag from a state not listed as one of PSI proliferation concern.
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Among notable international cases on genuine link are the Nottebohm Case (Second Phase)
(Liechtenstein v. Rep. of Guatemala), Judgment, 1955 I.CJ. (Apr. 6), p. 4 and Reparation for
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.CJ. (Apr.
11), p. 174.
36
R.R. CHURCHILL & A. V. LOWE, THE LA w OF THE SEA 262 (1999) [hereinafter CHURCHILL
& LOWE].
37
UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 92.

Membership of the PSI
In the span of eight years, the number of PSI participants has grown from the
original eleven to ninety-eight states. It continues to increase because th e number does
not include states that support but do not fully endorse the PSI or states that neither
oppose nor agree to the PSI. As of 2011, the number of states participating in the PSI,
the newest addition being Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, has increa sed to almost
half of states in the world. 38 Of these PSI participants, thirty-two are in Asia, five in
Africa, forty-two in Europe, six in Oceania, and thirteen in the Americas. Of these,
eighty-four have maritime areas, and eleven have concluded ship-boarding agreements
with the United States.
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Figure 1. World map of states endorsing the PSI (red).

38

Congressional Research Service, PSI Report 2011, available at http://assets.opencrs.com/
rpts/RL34327 _20110118.pdf.
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Figure 2. Geographic percentages of U .N. member states endorsing the PSI.
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Table 1
States Endorsing the PSI by Continent (N = 98)3 9
Africa (5)
Angola+
Djibouti+
Liberia*+
Libya+
Tunisia+

Americas (13)
Antigua and
Barbuda*+
Argentina+
Bahamas*+
Belize*+
Canada+
Chile+
Colombia+
El Salvador+
Honduras+
Panama*+
Paraguay
Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines*+
United States+

Asia (32)
Afghanistan
Armenia
Azerbaijan+
Bahrain+
Bosnia+
Brunei
Darussalam+
Cambodia+
Cyprus*+
Georgia+
Iraq+
Israel+
Japan+
Jordan+
Kazakhstan+
South Korea+
Kyrgyzstan+
Kuwait+
Mongolia*
Morocco+
Oman+
Papua New
Guinea+
Philippines+
Qatar+
Saudi Arabia+
Singapore+
Sri Lanka+
Tajikistan
Turkey+
Turkmenistan+
United Arab
Emirates+
Uzbekistan
Yemen+

Oceania (6)
Australia+
Fiji+
Marshall
Islands*+
New Zealand+
Samoa+
Vanuatu+

Europe (42)
Albania+
Andorra
Austria
Belarus
Belgium+
Bulgaria+
Croatia*+
Czech Republic
Denmark+
Estonia+
Finland+
France+
Germany+
Greece+
Holy See
Hungary
Iceland+
Ireland+
Italy+
Latvia+
Liechtenstein
Lithuania+
Luxembourg
Macedonia
Malta*+
Moldova
Montenegro+
Netherlands+
Norway+
Poland+
Portugal+
Romania+
Russia+
San Marino
Serbia
Slovakia
Slovenia+
Spain+
Sweden+
Switzerland
Ukraine+
United Kingdom+

Note:* Countries concluding ship-boarding agreements with the United States;+ Countries having
maritime areas.
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Id. at 10-11; see also U.S. Dep't of State, Proliferation Security Initiative Participants, Sept.
I 0, 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27732.htm.
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The effectiveness of the PSI as a maritime operation depends primarily on the
sea zones it covers and the ships it can interdict. Both sea zones and ships denote
sovereignty issues that require other states' participation for the PSI to work. Failing
to consider sea zones and ships will not only place the PSI in a difficult practical
situation but will also introduce legal complexities. Through its participants, the PSI
interdiction currently covers areas of nearly 75% of the world's seas. In total,
endorsements of the PSI by both declarations and ship-boarding agreements have
provided PSI participants with access to roughly 75% of all commercial shipping
vessels in the world (about 37,000 of 50,000 totals). 40
Endorsements of the PSI occur in the form of declarations and ship-boarding
agreements, as mentioned earlier. A declaration on the PSI normally highlights not
only expressed political willingness but also commitment to support the PSI in its
implementation. An example of a declaration supporting the PSI is that of Colombia:
By adhering to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Colombia expresses
its willingness to work jointly with members of PSI to prevent and stop the
transport of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related
materials. Colombia will devote resources and efforts to interdiction operations
and capabilities within the framework of the Initiative, in accordance with its
national law and national capabilities, and without prejudice of the efforts and
resources that Colombia should allocate to the maintenance of public order and
defense of the institutions against the actions of the illegal armed groups. 41
Similar commitments can also be found in ship-boarding agreements that support the
PSI, as shown in the preamble to the 2010 ship-boarding agreement between Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines and the United States:
40

Shipping and World Trade, Number of Ships (by Total and Trade), SHIPPING FACTS, Oct.
31, 2010, http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts/worldtrade/number-of-ships.php; see also
Hiroyuki Banzai, The Proliferation Security Initiative and International Law of the Sea: A
Japanese Lawyer's Perspective, 3 J. E. ASIA & INT'L L. 7, 20(2010).
41
U.S. Dep't of State, Colombia Endorses the Proliferation Security Initiative, May 17, 2010,
available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/05/141921.htm.

Convinced that trafficking in WMD, their delivery systems, and related items
by States and non-state actors of proliferation concern must be stopped;
Committed to cooperation to stop the flow by sea of WMD, their delivery
systems and related materials. 42
These forms of endorsement differ generally in the details of PSI procedures and
implementation but not in terms of commitment to support the PSI. In fact, given the
similar theme in the PSI, one may reasonably assume that most of the procedures and
implementation detailed in ship-boarding agreements are general practices in the PSI.
With regard to the legal effects of the two forms, this writer is of the opinion
that, under international law, declarations have legal effects comparable to those of
ship-boarding agreements. This view is derived from several international cases,
primarily before the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.), which held that declarations
may give rise to international obligations. 43 For example, in the Nuclear Test Case, the
I.C.J. highlighted two requirements for a declaration to have legal effects: it must be
bound to accept obligations and be publicly declared. Colombia's declaration to
endorse the PSI meets these requirements; it not only acknowledges transport of
WMD, delivery systems, and related materials as threats to international peace and
security, but it also accepts obligations, as described in the PSI. In addition, Colombia
has publicly announced such declaration.

Ship-Boarding Agreements
In the framework of the PSI, thus far, the United States has concluded eleven
ship-boarding agreements with states worldwide (see Appendix A). Some of these
42

SBA St. Vincent and the Grenadines, supra note 6, pmbl.
See Nuclear Test Case (Aust!. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.CJ. (Dec. 20), at 253 [hereinafter
Nuclear Test]; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.CJ. (Jun. 27), at 14 [hereinafter Nicaragua]; Frontier Dispute
(Burkina Faso v Rep. of Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. (Dec. 22), at 554.
43

states are major open-registry or flag-of-convenience countries, namely Antigua and
Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize, Cyprus, Liberia, Malta, the Marshall Islands, Panama,
and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. 44 These states are located in the Americas,
Asia, Europe, and Oceania. As noted previously, the PSI applies two methods in its
practices: access to sea zones and access to ships. The ship-boarding agreement
provides the means for the latter. On the basis of these ship-boarding agreements
alone, the PSI has full access to over 45% commercial ships worldwide, in addition to
the maritime area of each of these states.
Except for the agreement with Panama, the U.S. ship-boarding agreements are
generally divided into twenty sections: a preamble; definitions; object and purpose;
cases of suspect vessels; operations in international waters; operations in the territory
of a third state; jurisdiction over detained vessels; exchange of information and
notifications of results of actions of the security forces; conduct of security forces
officials; safeguards; use of forces; exchange of knowledge oflaws and policies of
other party; points of contact; disposition of seized property; claims; disputes and
consultations; rights, privileges and legal positions; cooperation and specialized
assistance; entry into force and duration; and rights for third states. For the purpose of
discussion, these twenty sections are classified into three major groups: the preamble,
object, and purpose; mechanisms of operation (before, during, and after); and
miscellaneous provisions.
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For the list of open-registry states, see Food and Agricultural Organizations of the United
Nations, Fishing and Aquacultural Department, Fishing Vessels Operating under Open
Registers and the Exercise of Flag State Responsibilities, App. 1, March 2002, available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y3824e/y3824e09.htm#TopOtPage.

In the standard preamble, the ship-boarding agreements refer to nine
international instruments, in addition to any relevant bilateral agreements between the
United States and the other party. These nine international instruments are the 1992
United Nations Security Council Presidential Statement; the 2004 United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1540; the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction (Paris); the 1968 Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(Washington, DC, London, and Moscow); the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Washington, DC, London, and Moscow);
the 2002 International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and its Updates
(International Maritime Organizations); the 2003 PSI Statement of Interdiction; the
2005 Protocol of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation; and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea. It is interesting to note that of all the international instruments recognized
in the ship-boarding agreements, only the 1982 UNCLOS has not yet been ratified by
the United States. 45
The object and purpose of the ship-boarding agreements is relatively simple: to
cooperate in preventing illicit transportation by vessels of items of proliferation
concern to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern. 46 In doing so, the
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See John E. Noyes, U.S. Policy and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 621,621 (2007); see also Horace B. Robertson Jr., The 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Historical Perspective on Prospects for
US Accession In International Law and Military Operations, 84 INT'L L. STUDIES 111, 111
(2008).
46
For example, see SBA St. Vincent and the Grenadines, supra note 6, at arts. l& 2;

parties, with reference to their national laws, recognizes principles of international law
on sovereign equality and territorial integrity. 47 In principle, the cooperation governs
the general mechanism for conducting PSI operations at sea, ranging primarily from
exchange of information to conduct of officials during operation to rights of third
states. This cooperation also provides access to almost all commercial or private
vessels of both parties. 48 Exception to the access is only for vessels under bareboatcharter arrangements as previously discussed. 49
The PSI mechanism of operation in the ship-boarding agreements can be
subdivided into before, during, and after interdiction phases that occur in international
waters, defined as all parts of the sea except archipelagic waters, territorial seas, and
internal waters of a state. 50 This mechanism of operation may also occur in the
territorial sea of a consenting third state. 51 For the pre-interdiction phase, exchange of
information concerning detection and location of suspect vessels 52 is crucial, in
addition to exchanging knowledge about laws and policies of the parties53 and
designated points of contact. 54 In this pre-interdiction phase, the process of obtaining

Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Malta Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials by Sea, Mar. 15, 2007, KAV 8327; Agreement
between the Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas and the Government of the
United States of America Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials By Sea, Aug. 11, 2008,
KAY 8618, arts. I & 2.
47
SBA St. Vincent and the Grenadines, supra note 6, at arts. 2(2) & 2(3).
48
Id. art. 1(8).
49
Id. art. 3(2).
50
Id. art. 1(9.)
51
Id. art. 5.
52
Id. arts. 4 & 7.
53
Id. art. 11.
54
Id. art. 12.

permission for interdiction takes place. 55 After such permission is received either by
response (written or oral)5 6 or assumption (two to four hour lapse oftime without
response), 57 the interdiction may take place.
During the interdiction phase, limitations are set, among other things, on use of
force,58 conduct of officials, 59 and safeguards. 60 The post-interdiction phase covers
issues such as jurisdiction over detained vessels, 61 claims for incidents that may have
occurred during interdiction, 62 and disposition of seized property. 63 In this postinterdiction phase, parties are also committed to exchanging information on results of
the interdiction. 64

55

Id.
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
56

art. 4.
art. 4(2).
arts. 4(3) & 4(c).
art. I 0.
art. 8.
art. 9.
art. 6.
art. 14.
art. 13.
art. 7(2).
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Table 2

Mechanisms of Operation under the Ship-Boarding Agreements
Interdiction
No.

Action

Before

During

After

1

Request to board suspect vessels

X

2

Respond to request

X

3

Boarding in the event of non-reply

4

Rights to visit

X

5

Notification to master

X

6

Exchange of operational information

X

7

Notification of results

X

8

Status of reports

X

9

Conduct of security force officials

X

10

Safeguards

X

11

Use of force

X

12

Exchange of knowledge of laws and
policies of other party

X

X

X

13

Points of contact

X

X

X

14

Disposition of seized property

X

15

Claims

X

16

Evaluation of implementation

X

17

Cooperation and specialized assistance

X

X

In the miscellaneous provisions, several articles should be noted. First is the
right of the third state, in which the non-U.S. party of the ship-boarding agreement is
given discretion to allow interdiction exercise of the former's suspect ships. Such
discretion comes with a condition that the third state will comply with all provisions
related to interdiction rights set forth in the ship-boarding agreement that the non-U.S.
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party has committed to or mutatis mutandis. 65 This article indicates that not only other
PSI participants but also non-PSI states may conduct interdiction of non-U.S. suspect
ships under the ship-boarding agreement. The second article to note is the duration of
the ship-boarding agreement. Although both parties agree to evaluate its
implementation, 66 the ship-boarding agreement offers no clarification as to the
duration of the agreement; thus, it can be terminated only upon written notification. 67
Program and Activity of the PSI
In general, the PSI program and activities can be classified into two major
types: the Operational Experts Group Meeting, which is the lead forum, and field
exercises, including maritime interdiction, field scenarios, port interdiction, combined
interdiction (sea, land, and air), gaming, and shipping-container workshops. The
twenty-one member states of the Operational Experts Group Meeting, which
coordinates PSI activities, are Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Since 2003, the PSI has conducted forty-eight field exercises and convened
twenty-three Operational Experts Group Meetings. Although there is no fixed
schedule for meetings and exercises, the frequency of PSI activities range from five to
thirteen annually. In terms of results, PSI participants claimed to have conducted
eleven interdictions in 2005 and two dozen other efforts to prevent transfers of
equipment and WMD materials from 2005-2006, in addition to assisting with more

65
66
67

Id. art. 19.
Id. art. 15(2).
Id. art. 18(3).

than thirty shipment interdictions in 2006. 68 Besides the PSI core activities, other
initiatives related to the PSI include the Megaport Initiative, the Container Security
Initiative, the Secure Freight Initiative, the Customs Trade Partnership against
Terrorism, the Global Initiative to Combat Terrorism, and Cooperative Threat
Reduction. 69 Due to the nature of PSI secret operations, it is difficult for the public to
learn of the PSI's results, let alone obtain any information on the activities.
At present, no international tribunal has tried a PSI-related case or interdiction.
PSI-interdiction cases, if any, are settled through diplomatic channels. Nevertheless,
PSI participants have claimed that they have conducted numerous PSI-related
interdictions worldwide since its inception in 2003. Among the claimed cases of PSI
interdictions are BBC China in October 2003, 70 coolers cargo in February 2005,
chromium-nickel steel plates cargo in November 2006, ballistic missile components
cargo in February 2007, sodium perchlorate cargo in April 2007, and ballistic missiles
cargo in June 2007. 71 In general, the outcome of these interdiction efforts is that the

68

Congressional Research Service, PSI Report 2008, available at http://assets.opencrs.com/
rpts/RL34327 _20080204.pdf.
69
Phillip A. Foley, Paper presented at the Proliferation Security Initiative in the Framework of
Maritime Security Symposium: PSI: U.S. Perspective (Dec 12, 2007) (on file with the
Directorate General of Law and International Treaties Library, Indonesian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs); see also Christopher Shiraldi, U.S. National Security Implications of the UN.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 27 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 519, 519 (2008); Marjorie
Florestal, Terror on the High Seas: The Trade and Development Implications of U.S. National
Security Measures, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 385, 385 (Winter 2007); Yann-Huei Song, Security in
the Strait of Malacca and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative: Responses to the U.S.
Proposal, in GLOBAL LEGAL CHALLENGES: COMMAND OF THE COMMONS, STRATEGIC
COMMUNICATIONS AND NATURAL DISASTERS 97, 98 (Michael D. Carsten ed., 2007).
7
Concerning a German flag freighter bound to Libya, cooperation among U.S., U.K.,
German, and Italian governments stopped the BBC China in the Suez Canal, found centrifuge
parts, and confiscated them. After unloading the centrifuge parts, the BBC China was released
to continue its course to Libya.
71
Coolers cargo, Feb. 2005 (a ship bound to Iran from Europe with coolers cargo for heavywater reactor program; the European government denied the export license after being notified
by the U.S.); chromium-nickel steel plates cargo, Nov. 2006 (a ship bound to Iran from Asia
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cargoes were never shipped to their original destinations. The measures in these cases
ranged from interdiction per se to detour to other actions that inhibited the cargoes
from reaching their intended destinations. The seized cargoes are usually returned to
the original supplier state.
With regard to location, PSI maritime operations cover sea zones governed in
the UNCLOS, that is, territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones,
continental shelves, and the high seas, in addition to straits used for international
navigation and archipelagic waters. The rule of thumb in these zone divisions is that
territorial seas and the high seas are two opposite poles in terms of sovereignty and
jurisdiction, the former being exclusive while the latter is inclusive. For straits used for
international navigation, the rules are subject to the sea zones delimiting such straits
while archipelagic waters follow territorial sea regimes. Within these sea zones, there
are exceptions that allow other states sovereignty and jurisdiction. These exceptions
include innocent, transit, and archipelagic sea-lane passages.
Selected Countries Views on the PSI
Country views of the PSI can be divided into two groups: proponents, PSI-

'
'l\'.

participating countries, and opponents, non-participating countries. This dissertation

<:;,

examines only two countries, one representing each group, Australia for the proponent
and Indonesia for the opponent. The primary reasons for their selection are that the
with steel plates for a missile program; interdicted, steel plates confiscated and returned to
original supplier country in Asia); ballistic missile components cargo, Feb. 2007 (a ship bound
to Syria from the U.S. with ballistic missile components cargo; inspected, cargo seized and
returned to the U.S.); sodium perchlorate cargo, Apr. 2007 (a ship bound to Iran from Asia
with sodium perchlorate cargo used for rocket propellants; interdicted and detoured to an
Asian port); ballistic missile cargo, June 2007 (a Syrian plane bound to North Korea with
suspected cargo related to ballistic missiles; denied over flight rights) as described in Wade
Boese, Interdiction Initiative Successes Assessed, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, July/August 2008,
available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008 _ 07-08/lnterdiction.
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PSI receives much criticism from Asia, in particular Southeast Asia, and Asia is one of
the world's major maritime routes. With some of the world's busiest ports, airports,
and trans-shipment centers, Asia has a higher probability of being used to transfer
WMD worldwide. Indonesia is the largest archipelagic country in the world, the first
country in the world that declared its archipelagic status, and one of the key countries
proposing the prevailing archipelagic concept under the UN CLOS. Australia is one of
the United States' strongest allies, supporting the PSI while being located close to
Asia between the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific Ocean.

Participating country: Australia. First, the Australian Government believes
that the proliferation of WMD is a serious threat to international peace and security. 72
Therefore, it is strongly interested in and committed to non-proliferation and
disarmament, in particular the PSI. Nevertheless, the Australian government holds that
the PSI is not a substitute for maintaining and strengthening the existing multilateral
WMD regimes. 73 Neither is the PSI a replacement for having an export control
mechanism. Rather, the Australian government views the PSI as part of its security
framework to deny proliferating WMD and related technology, given the current
world situation with North Korea conducting nuclear tests in 2006 and Iran
maintaining its persistent refusal to cooperate with the IAEA. 74 In addition, the

72

Ted Knez, Paper presented at Proliferation Security Initiative in the Framework of Maritime
Security Symposium: Australian Perspective on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
(Dec. 12, 2007) ( on file with the Directorate General of Law and International Treaties
Library, Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) [hereinafter Knez]; see also Donald R.
Rothwell & Cameron Moore, Australia's Traditional Maritime Security Concerns and Post9/1 J Perspective, in MARITIME SECURITY: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY PERSPECTIVE
FROM AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 37-53 (Natalie Klein, Joanna Mossop, & Donald R.
Rothwell eds., 20 I 0).
73
Knez, supra note 72.
74 Id.
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Australian government argues that it has an international legal obligation derived from
UNSC Resolution 1540 to prevent the proliferation of WMD. 75
The Australian government further asserts that the PSI effectively
complements and reinforces existing multilateral structures or laws, in this case
combating proliferation of WMD and terrorism. 76 In terms of its membership, the PSI
does not discriminate against any country because it is not an exclusive club. In fact,
the strength of the PSI lies in its diversity and inclusiveness. In reality, according to
the Australian government, most of the work of the PSI is not about dramatic
interdictions at sea. Rather, it is the everyday work of good intelligence, export
controls, and law enforcement efforts. 77 In other words, most PSI work takes place in
port.
The PSI is a cooperative activity intended to address transnational issues.
When issues extend beyond the boundaries of any one country and that particular
country alone cannot manage or resolve such issues, then cooperation may provide a
solution. In this case, the PSI functions as a cooperative activity similar to Southeast
Asia's cooperation in addressing disaster relief and tackling transnational crime such
as drug trafficking and illegal fishing. With the increasing attempts to spread WMD,
countries should look for ways to enhance their ability to counter the threat of such
proliferation. The PSI is a way to counter that threat.
The Australian government views the PSI as a new type of strategic thinking
t

,l}

and flexibility, which Australia had already embraced through its own counter-

1s
76

77

Id.
Id.
Id.

terrorism and counter-proliferation efforts. 78 The PSI is practical, flexible, and nonbureaucratic because it is not a formal organization. Under the PSI, countries can
exercise and test their defense and law enforcements procedures, share information,
and perform actual maritime and air interdictions. In terms of methods, the Australian
government has in place a procedure that includes conditions and requirements for
providing consent in the event of a PSI request. Hence, consent from the Australian
government is not automatic but decided on a case-by-case basis. In other words, the
Australian government maintains its national sovereignty with regard to PSI
requests. 79

Non-participating country: Indonesia. Indonesia is party to the UNeLOS,
all U.N. conventions on terrorism, ewe, BTWe, and NPT, as well as the ASEAN
Free Weapons Zone Treaty; so it prohibits the proliferation of WMD. The Indonesian
government's concern about the PSI lies primarily with the notion that the PSI will
limit its sovereignty or sovereign rights by undermining relevant rules of international
law affecting internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial seas, straits used for

°

international navigation, exclusive economic zones, and high seas. 8 Furthermore, the
fact that Indonesia is in a strategic location between two major oceans and connects
two major continents makes it difficult to comply with the PSI measures. With

Id.
79 Id.
80
Hasjim Ojala!, Paper presented at Proliferation Security Initiative in the Framework of
Maritime Security Symposium: Proliferation Security Initiative (Dec. 12, 2007) (on file with
the Directorate General of Law and International Treaties Library, Indonesian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs); see also Andy Rachmadianto, Paper presented at Proliferation Security
Initiative in the Framework of Maritime Security Symposium: Proliferation Security Initiative:
A Weapons of Mass Destruction Non Proliferation and Disarmament Perspective (Dec. 12,
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hundreds of vessels of all flags passing through Indonesian waters from Africa,
Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, the task of conducting PSI interdiction
may seem impossible. The Indonesian government also holds that PSI measures, from
responding to interdiction requests to exchanging confidential information to
conducting an interdiction with possible use of force, are more likely to obstruct
international navigation than support it. 81
From the political viewpoint, Indonesia has reservations about the PSI,
i~.

especially concerning the process of drafting the PSI, the dual use of materials for
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weapons of mass destruction, and the use of weapons of mass destruction for
terrorism. 82 First, the process of formulating the PSI was selective, unilateral in nature,
and not multilaterally negotiated. The goal of the PSI is pre-emptive and originally
targeted only the "proliferators" of the "Axis of Evil" states. Indication of this
selectiveness and lack of multilateral negotiation was apparent during the UNSC
meeting in 2004 adopting UNSC Resolution 1540. Despite the fact that the Security
Council adopted Resolution 1540, it failed to include a reference to interdiction,
despite the PSI wording, because it was strongly rejected by China and some nonaligned countries. Furthermore, several countries remain skeptical about the
implementation ofUNSC Resolution 1540, simply because the UNSC adopted the
resolution without a transparent, inclusive, and multilaterally negotiated process.
The Indonesian government argues that the dual use of WMD and associated
technology in civilian and military application makes interdictions difficult to
implement. Thus, doing so would only hamper legitimate commerce and shipping
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Rachmadianto, supra note 80.
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activities in the already-busy routes in Indonesian waters. 83 The difficulty in
identifying the exact use for the alleged materials of WMD will inevitably lead to
political decisions concerning countries sending or receiving the cargo. For example,
although India, Pakistan, and Israel are "nuclear weapon-capable states" and not
parties to the NPT, PSI-participating countries do not consider them to be "states of
proliferation concern." Hence, these countries are apparently exempt from PSI
interdictions. Yet if the cargo belongs to or ships to one of the "Axis of Evil" countries
or the so-called "rogue" states, it would probably be targeted for PSI interdiction.
With regard to combating terrorism through WMD, the Indonesian government
holds the view that the current regimes have already addressed that issue.

84

The

existing multilateral instruments addressing WMD already provide for cooperation
and mandate states to take national measures in terms of legislation, export control,
border control, and information and intelligence sharing. Many states that are party to
the multilateral instruments addressing WMD, including Indonesia, have enacted
relevant laws and regulations that criminalize terrorists acquiring WMD and related
materials. Hence, one can argue that the PSI and its unilateral motive may undermine
the existing WMD regimes.
A recent development in Indonesia's position on the PSI is reflected in the
results of a bilateral meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Clinton and Indonesian
Minister of Foreign Affairs Natalegawa, which took place before the APEC Summit
2011 in Honolulu, November 11, 2011. 85 In his response to requests from Secretary
Clinton for Indonesia to join the PSI, Minister Natalegawa stated that Indonesia is
83
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currently in the process of studying it. Further, Minister Natalegawa asserted that
Indonesia recognizes the motive of the PSI, that is, stopping the illicit trafficking of
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WMD, but holds a different view of the means for attaining that end. Indonesia is
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carefully observing consistency where the PSI is concerned, in particular in its
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implementation, and comparing the PSI to prevailing international legal instruments,
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including the UNCLOS. In his last remarks in the discussions on the PSI, Minister
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Natalegawa expressed Indonesia's expectation that the means or implementation of
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the PSI should accord with the prevailing international law and should not cause a
bottleneck in achieving mutual objectives related to reducing or eliminating
proliferation of WMD.
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Chapter 3
The PSI and International Law
International law scholars hold different views about the PSI. Those who favor
it argue primarily that the PSI complements relevant regimes of international law,
from combating terrorism to countering proliferation of WMD. 86 Its complementary
character is apparent in the motive shared by international instruments, including
UNSC Resolution 154087 and the NPT. 88 The argument continues that, given the vast
number of participating countries, the PSI serves as an international network that
works in identifying threats to international peace and security and in taking concrete
action to suppress those threats. In so doing, the PSI respects national and international
law, complying with rules such as flag-state consent, interdiction, and use of force.
On the other hand, scholars questioning the PSI opine that its application will
affect international navigation worldwide, thereby possibly undermining the regime of
freedom of navigation recognized by international law. 89 With few exceptions, the
UN CLOS guarantees freedom of navigation to virtually all ships from all countries in
the world, from territorial seas with innocent, transit, and archipelagic passages to the
high seas. There is a fine line between the act of transporting and crime, and the
UNCLOS exists to protect the balance between the former and the latter. The PSI, in
pursuing the latter, tends to weaken the former. Interdiction as one of the PSI's
86
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primary manifestations will, among other hindrances, prolong navigation times and
add unnecessary burden to international navigation, even if the PSI conducts
interdiction in a random manner. In addition, the notion that the PSI allows use of
force in its interdiction may harm international peace and security.
Nevertheless, these two contending views have something in common: that the
PSI touches international law, primarily the regimes of sovereignty, freedom of
navigation, terrorism, WMD, and use of force. For example, the PSI motive, which is
stopping the illicit transfer of WMD by state and non-state actors of proliferation
concern, affects regimes combating terrorism and proliferation of WMD because it
}fl:

adds a new method to address the concerns of the regimes. The PSI motive attempts to
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accommodate these two regimes by conducting, among other unilateral acts, maritime
interdiction. As a result, this ability to conduct unilateral maritime interdiction has
triggered discussion that PSI methods may have the potential to undermine
sovereignty, freedom of navigation, and use of force regimes. The PSI maritime
interdiction of foreign ships in foreign maritime zones raises issues of jurisdiction,
passages, and self-defense, among others.
In brief, the sovereignty issues covering maritime zones include territorial seas,
contiguous zones, archipelagic waters, straights used for international navigation,
exclusive economic zones, continental shelves, and the high seas, with the question
being whether PSI interdiction in these zones violates existing international law.
Discussions on the freedom of navigation regime focus on ships: whether the PSI
violates ships mobility guaranteed by the freedom of navigation. Analysis of the PSI
concerning regimes for combating terrorism and proliferation of WMD addresses

whether the PSI complements these two regimes. Finally, concerning the use of force,
the question is whether the PSI' s limited application of use of force is permissible
under international law. In a wider scope, PSI application may touch other regimes of
international law, such as state responsibility, piracy, and liabilities. Given the
minimal impact of the PSI on these other regimes, however, these topics are reserved
for future research and discussion.
Sovereignty

Relevant to the PSI, the regime of sovereignty focuses on two parts: maritime
\

zones and ships. Under the UN CLOS, a state has different sovereignty for each
maritime zone, from being exclusive, as in territorial seas, to being inclusive, as in the
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high seas. In contrast to maritime zones, sovereignty of a state over a ship is generally
exclusive. Enforcement of sovereignty in both maritime zones and ships is subject to a
regime of international law known as jurisdiction. 90 The UN CLOS division of
maritime zones indicates that, although a state may have sovereignty, its sovereignty
does not necessarily mean that it has automatic jurisdiction of the area. This is the case
with the PSI, which allows enforcement of one state's jurisdiction in another state's
area of sovereignty.
Hypothetically, there are several scenarios in which the PSI can be exercised in
maritime zones and against ships. First, the PSI can interdict a foreign ship in a foreign
maritime zone. In this first scenario, the PSI requires two consents, those of the coastal
state and the flag state. Second, the PSI can conduct interdiction of a foreign ship but
in a PSI-participating maritime zone. In this particular scenario, the PSI needs the

90

See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LA w 106 (2008) [hereinafter
BROWNLIE].

consent only of the flag state. Finally, the PSI can perform interdiction of a ship from
a PSI-participating country but in a foreign maritime zone. Similar to the second
scenario, the third scenario requires only a single consent, but of a different type, that
of the coastal state.
In light of these scenarios, the maritime zone discussion focuses on coastalstate consent while the ship discussion analyzes flag-state consent. In addition,
however, for the purpose of classification, another scenario is posited in which the PSI
covers all the elements. In this scenario, the PSI conducts interdiction of a ship from a
PSI-participating country in a PSI-participating maritime zone. This scenario, taking
into account that the PSI carries out its interdiction within the PSI network, requires
neither coastal nor flag state consents. In a sense, this last scenario is similar to an
exercise of sovereignty of a state over its territory, so it needs no further analysis.

Maritime Zones
Before the PSI locus analysis, this section includes a brief discussion of sea
zones under the UN CLOS and possible areas of law that are open to multiple
interpretations. Within these possible areas, the PSI may find justification for its
interdictions. The discussion begins with analysis of maritime zones with exclusive
sovereignty: territorial seas and archipelagic waters. Then, the discussion focuses on
maritime zones with sovereign rights: contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones,
and continental shelves.
To begin with, the UNCLOS divides the territorial sea regime into thirty
articles in three major parts: legal status, 91 limits, 92 and rules on ships passing the
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UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 2.
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zone. 93 The legal status affirms that a territorial sea, which starts from the end of a
land's territory to an adjacent belt of sea, 94 falls under the sovereignty of the coastal
state. Such sovereignty, nevertheless, comes with an exception of innocent passage for
c•
a 1ore1gn
sh"1p. 9s

The UNCLOS permits a foreign ship to navigate through a coastal state's
territorial sea as long as such navigation follows the requirements set forth in the
UNCLOS. Among the noted requirements are continuous and expeditious modes and
innocent purposes not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal
state. Furthermore, the legal status and rules for ships passing in a territorial sea are
subject to a caveat that requires consistency not only with the UNCLOS but also with
other rules of international law. 96 In other words, other rules of international law may
be applicable within a territorial sea. The UNCLOS does not, however, clarify further
the applicability of other rules of international law in territorial seas.
As comprehensive as the UNCLOS may appear, the provisions addressing
territorial seas raise issues, one of which is a caveat. In the UN CLOS, although the
preamble indicates UN CLOS primacy over rules and principles of general
international law, such indication does not address, among other issues, which types of
general international law are referenced. Under Article 38 of the I.C.J. Statute, 97 the
primary sources of international law are international convention, customary
international law, and general principles of law. Teleological interpretations of the
93
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preamble suggest that these primary sources of law may apply for matters not
governed in the UN CLOS. Following that line of interpretation, at the extreme and in
favor of the PSI, one may argue that, because the international community recognizes
combating terrorism as an international law norm, measures by coastal states to
prevent terrorism may take place in a territorial sea, thereby justifying PSI
interdiction.
If the PSI is applicable in a territorial sea, of which a coastal state has

exclusive sovereignty, then one may also argue that the PSI is legitimate in other
maritime zones where a coastal state has fewer sovereign rights. UNCLOS governance
of maritime zones starts with territorial seas having the most exclusive sovereignty
and gradually ends with the high seas, which are open to all states. This gradual effect
is apparent in contiguous zones, where the UNCLOS indicates only coastal sovereign
rights, exclusive economic zones with respect to their living resources, and the
continental shelf with its resources shared by other countries. The gradual effect is
also visible in other maritime zones, namely straits used for international navigation
and archipelagic waters.
The UNCLOS defines a strait used for international navigation as a strait that
connects high seas and an exclusive economic zone or vice versa. 98 Under this
definition, a strait used for international navigation can be a coastal state territorial sea,
exclusive economic zone, or contiguous zone. If part of a strait used for international
navigation is a territorial sea, then the right of other states to navigate through it falls
under the zone of a territorial sea, which is innocent passage. For maritime zones other
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than territorial seas, transit passage applies. 99 The rights and duties of states in these
zones with straits used for international navigation are subject to the UNCLOS and
other rules of international law. 100 Thus, PSI interdiction might be applicable in a strait
used for international navigation.
With regard to archipelagic waters, the gist of this regime is to eliminate
possible sea pockets that may jeopardize the political, geographical, and economic
integrity of an archipelagic state. 101 An archipelagic state has exclusive sovereignty
over its archipelagic waters. Different from those of a territorial sea, the right and
duties of an archipelagic state are subject solely to the UN CLOS, with an exception of
innocent passage, which is subject to other rules of international law. 102 In addition to
the rights of other states in archipelagic waters, the UN CLOS recognizes archipelagic
sea-lanes passage with similar provisions to transit passage. 103 To this end, the
applicability of PSI interdiction in archipelagic waters is comparable to that for a
territorial sea, that is, under the exclusive jurisdiction of a coastal state.
PSI participants argue that the PSI may enforce jurisdiction via interdiction in
any maritime zone as long as relevant consents have been obtained. They argue that,
for maritime zones with exclusive sovereignty such as archipelagic waters, territorial
seas, and internal waters, the PSI requires not only coastal state and but also flag state
consent. They further argue that the PSI requires only flag state consent to conduct
interdiction in maritime zones with sovereign rights and open-to-all characters, such as
contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones (including straits used for international
99
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navigation connecting two exclusive economic zones and straits used for international
navigation connecting exclusive economic zones), the continental shelf, and the high
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seas. The interdiction, nevertheless, should respect coastal state sovereign rights
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within the maritime zones and practices of international navigation.
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The PSI defines maritime zones into zones with sovereign rights and zones
open-to-all states or referred to as international waters. 104 The definition covers
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contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, the continental shelf, the high seas, and
straits used for international navigation. Of all the zones in which the PSI may enforce
interdiction, the high seas and straits used for international navigation are less
controversial than contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, and continental
shelves, largely because the UN CLOS recognizes the sovereign rights of coastal states
in these zones. The high seas, on the other hand, are open to all states; hence, no claim
of sovereignty can be made, nor can sovereign rights be reserved. As for straits used
for international navigation, the regimes are subject to the zones bordering such straits,
either the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.
With regard to the PSI and the maritime zones with sovereign rights, the
discussion is focused on two major questions: whether PSI interdiction is applicable
within these zones and whether PSI interdiction will hamper the exercise of coastal
states' sovereign rights. The fact that the UNCLOS provides a state with limited
sovereignty within these maritime zones does not mean that other states may enforce
their jurisdiction therein. Neither does it mean, however, that no jurisdiction is
enforceable in the said maritime zones. Because the UNCLOS does not specifically
govern enforcement of another state's jurisdiction within a state's contiguous zone,
104
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exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf, the focus of this dissertation is on
attempting to identify which rules are applicable. Teleological interpretation, pursuant
to the UNCLOS preamble, will be applied for matters not regulated by the rules and
principles of general international law. 105
Concerning exclusive economic zones and a continental shelf, in addition to
the UNCLOS preamble, each has its own clarifications. In exclusive economic zones,
the rights and duties of other states may be governed by other pertinent rules of
international law as long as such rights and duties are compatible with the
UNCLOS. 106 Concerning a continental shelf, the UNCLOS does not clarify whether
other rules of international law can govern the rights of a coastal state; 107 however, in
exercising such rights, coastal states must respect other states' rights that are subject to
other rules of international law. 108 In a nutshell, the PSI in a contiguous zone, an
exclusive economic zone, and a continental shelf will be governed by general
international law, in particular rules that are compatible with the UN CLOS.
To identify which general international law applies to PSI interdiction in a
state's contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf, references are
once again made to sources of the international law framework, as noted in Article 38
of the I.CJ. Statute, namely international agreement, customary international law, and
general principles of international law. Based on this reference, one can validly submit
that the general international law applicable to PSI interdiction within the maritime
zones is international agreements, that is, PSI commitments and ship-boarding
105
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agreements. Because PSI participants have their own consent arrangements,
interdiction within PSI participants' contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, and
continental shelves is permissible under international law. Yet although PSI
interdiction finds legal justification through international agreements among its
participants, such is certainly not the case for states not participating in the PSI.
In the maritime zones of non-participating states, it could be difficult to
,,1
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identify a comprehensive legal justification, let alone enforce PSI-based interdiction.
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Aside from the absence of PSI-interdiction regimes in international law, the UN CLOS
recognizes greater rights and responsibilities of coastal states within their contiguous
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zones, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves compared to those of other
states. 109 This recognition provides the coastal states with priority in taking necessary
actions within their maritime zones, although such actions are limited. As difficult as it
may seem, however, in practice PSI interdiction in non-participating states' maritime
zones is generally conducted via bilateral arrangements on a case-by-case basis. 110
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Considerations of this practice are arguably political rather than legal in nature. Given
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the character of PSI interdiction, such practices remain confidential and are rarely
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announced to the public.
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Taking into account that the UNCLOS gives coastal states preference in their
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maritime zones, one may propose a valid interpretation that the exercise of coastal
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states' sovereign rights must prevail over other states' interests. This interpretation
would suggest a condition that if application of other states' interests does not hinder
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the exercise of a coastal state's sovereign rights, then such application may be deemed
as not in violation of the UN CLOS. As long as such application meets the condition,
other states may exercise their interests in a coastal state's contiguous zone, exclusive
economic zone, and continental shelf. Fallowing this line of interpretation, PSI
interdiction may be justified provided that it does not impede the exercise of a coastal
state's sovereign rights.
Ships

Unlike regimes on maritime zones on which the UN CLOS is silent other than
for activities prescribed as coastal states' sovereign rights, the general rule of
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international law is clear concerning ships as territorial extensions of a state. Unless
there is an intervening situation, 111 exclusive jurisdiction over a ship lies with its flag
state, irrespective of the ship's location. 112 Thus, because a ship is an extended
territory of its flag state, the flag state's consent plays a crucial role when another state
exercises jurisdiction over its ship. Under the PSI arrangement, interdiction is
permissible among ships of PSI participants, including those states having shipboarding agreements. Controversy arises when PSI participants conduct interdiction of
ships of non-participating states without their prior consent. This scenario, however, is
:j1!
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not likely to occur.
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To date, PSI interdiction has followed mandated flag-state consent, even
among PSI participants. In other words, flag-state consent is not automatic as a result
i4

~~.

of being a PSI participant. The only arrangement that is close to automatic consent is
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assumed consent. In terms of assumed consent, a PSI participant may conduct
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interdiction of a ship of another PSI participant if the latter does not respond to a
consent request from the former in a specified time frame. In ship-boarding
agreements, the specified time frame ranges from two to four hours, with the end of
this period initiating the assumed consent arrangements. Afterwards, the PSI
participant conducting assumed-consent interdiction would provide its full report to
the flag state.
Besides flag-state consent, theoretically other states have interests in a ship, for
example, cargo origin, destination, and owner. A state may be the origin-owner, the
destination-owner, or even simply the owner of the cargo in a ship. Under normal
conditions, the flag state has exclusive jurisdiction over these cargo interests. The
condition changes, however, when a flag state approves a PSI-interdiction request.
Under ship-boarding agreements, the party conducting the PSI interdiction may
exercise its jurisdiction over the seized cargo. The flag state no longer has jurisdiction
of the cargo. In other words, the interdicting state may transfer, sell, or dispose of the
cargo. Nevertheless, in most successful PSI-interdiction incidents made known to the
public, the PSI returns the suspected cargo to its country of origin and not its country
of destination.
In theory, the party that will suffer the most losses in the event of seized cargo
is the destination-owner because that party may have paid for the cargo either in part
or in full. Consequently, a seized cargo incident will add more burdens to the flag state
and users of commercial ships, particularly if the interdicting state decides not to
return the seized cargo. As a result, in the context of the PSI, users of commercial
,I

ships will demand higher assurance from the flag states in the event of PSI-based
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interdiction. Failure to provide appropriate assurance in the case of a PSI interdiction
may significantly hamper commercial navigations worldwide.
A recent international development, however, may alter the view that a PSI
interdiction will impede international commercial navigations. As of July 28, 2010,
the 2005 SUA Protocols' 13 entered into force after Nauru deposited its instrument of
ratification with the IMO on April 29, 2010. Based on this protocol, state parties must
treat the illicit transfer of WMD or carrying WMD as an offense or a crime. 114 Thus,
member states to the protocol are under legal obligation to suppress this particular
crime. As for commercial users, the fact that the illicit transfer of WMD constitutes a
crime will leave them no choice but to comply and treat the PSI as a measure
,..,
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recognized by law.
Freedom of Navigation
Of all the issues related to freedom of navigation, exercising it in territorial
seas and archipelagic waters remains debatable, if not sensitive, because two
conflicting interests are at play-the interests of the coastal or bordering states and
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those of international navigation of the flag state. The coastal or bordering state holds
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the view that international navigation will undermine its sovereignty while the
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international community contends that freedom of navigation must be preserved due to
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its economic significance. In reconciling the two interests, the international
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community has set a balance under the UN CLOS. There are requirements for each
type of passage, and failing to meet them will result in coastal or bordering state
jurisdiction. The balance serves as a bridge between these two foreign interests.
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Customary international law recognizes freedom of navigation, 115 which is
codified by the UNCLOS in three major forms: innocent passage,
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace,
good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in
any of the following activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in
violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter
of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence
or security of the coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the
coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person
contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations of the coastal State;
(h) any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act claimed at interfering with any systems of communication or
any other facilities or installations of the coastal State;
(1) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage. 116
Transit passage,
1. Ships and aircraft, while exercising the right of transit passage, shall:
(a) proceed without delay through or over the strait;
(b) refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of State bordering the
strait, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(c) refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal
modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary
by force majeure or by distress;
(d) comply with other relevant provisions of this Part. 117
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Freedom of the high seas,
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1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked.
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this
Convention and other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both
for coastal and land-locked States:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;
( c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI;
( d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted
under international law, subject to Part VI;
( e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2;
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and
also with due regard for their rights under this Convention with respect to
118
activities in the Area.
The rules indicate that a foreign ship, irrespective of its cargo, may traverse a
territorial sea or archipelagic waters under innocent passage, straits used for
international navigation via transit passage, and other zones with the freedom of the
high seas. These freedoms come with requirements that a ship must abide by. The
requirements vary according to the maritjme zones. For instance, innocent passage
carries more conditions compared to transit passage because it passes a zone in which
a coastal or archipelagic state has exclusive sovereignty. Similarly, freedom of the
high seas has the least requirements compared to innocent passage because the high
seas are open to all states and no state may claim the sovereignty thereof, unless
otherwise governed. As for freedom of navigation in a contiguous zone, exclusive
economic zone, and continental shelf, they are all subject to the limited sovereign
rights of the coastal state.
For innocent, transit, and archipelagic sea-lane passages, the primary issue
with the PSI lies in the definition offreedom of navigation. The UN CLOS does not

118

Id. art. 87.
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include the PSI per seas a motive that could serve as a basis for interdiction. 119 One
may argue that the application of the PSI will cause imbalance by creating
impediments to international navigation. One may further argue by drawing an
analogy between impediments caused by the PSI and that of laying mines in ports that
infringe on international navigation, as decided by I.CJ. in the Nicaragua Case:
On the other hand, it is true that in order to enjoy access to ports, foreign
vessels possess a customary right of innocent passage in territorial waters for
the purposes of entering or leaving internal waters; Article 18, paragraph I (b ),
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982,
does no more than codify customary international law on this point. Since
freedom of navigation is guaranteed, first in the exclusive economic zones,
which may exist beyond territorial waters (Art. 58 of the Convention), and
secondly, beyond territorial waters and on the high seas (Art. 87), it follows
that any State that enjoys a right of access to ports for its ships also enjoys all
the freedom necessary for maritime navigation. It may therefore be said that, if
this right of access to the port is hindered by the laying of mines by another
State, what is infringed is the freedom of communications and of maritime
commerce. At all events, it is certain that interference with navigation in these
areas prejudices both the sovereignty of the coastal State over its internal
waters, and the right of free access enjoyed by foreign ships. 120
One may counter, however, that given the international concern and potentials
of terrorism and abuse of WMD, PSI interdiction may be an effective measure to
address such concerns. 121 Moreover, in practice, PSI interdiction is limited by certain
criteria and does not have the effect of literally blocking international navigation as
does laying mines in ports. In addition, the PSI requires both coastal- and flag-state

119

Arguably, UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 23 ("Foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships
carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substance shall, when exercising the
right of innocence passage through the territorial sea, carry documents and observe special
precautionary measures established for such ships by international agreements") may come
close to including the PSI motive based on cargo specification. Furthermore, some states'
practices demand prior notification of ships falling under this particular article; see
CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 36, at 92.
120
Nicaragua, supra note 43, at 111, para. 124 (emphasis added).
121
See BROWNLIE, supra note 90, at 746 (discussing forcible measures to occlude sources of
terrorism).

consents in conducting interdiction in zones where innocent, transit, and archipelagic
sea-lane passages are exercised. The requirement of these consents may well waive
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freedom of navigation because both the coastal or bordering state and the flag state
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have considered PSI interdiction in terms of their internal interests. In this sense, there
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are no longer contending or conflicting interests. Similarly, for freedom of the high
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seas in zones other than a territorial sea or archipelagic waters, provided that relevant
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consent has been obtained, PSI interdiction does not violate or contradict the freedom
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of the high seas. The relevant consents also waive coastal state primacy over other
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states in exercising sovereign rights such as exploration and exploitation of mineral
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resources.
Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction
At the outset, it is submitted that the PSI motive is not a stand-alone motive.
I

Based on documents referring both to the PSI statement of interdiction and ship-
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boarding agreements, the PSI motive is derived from existing regimes of international
law, in particular that of combating terrorism and proliferation of WMD. In other
words, without the aforementioned existing regimes of international law, the PSI
motive cannot exist. Moreover, to a certain extent, the PSI also connects combating
terrorism and non-proliferation of WMD regimes. The connection between the PSI
motive and these regimes is apparent by observing the contents of its international
instruments.
The primary international instrument is UNSC Resolution 1540, which shows
the highest degree of connection to the PSI due to its status and content. The status of
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I I

UNSC Resolution 1540 is binding on all U.N. member states through Article 25 122 of
the U.N. Charter. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the UNSC unanimously
adopted Resolution 1540 in its 4956th meeting on April 28, 2004. The Resolution has
sixteen preamble paragraphs (PP) and twelve operative paragraphs (OP) covering
matters of proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as well as their
means of delivery. The particular importance of this Resolution is the UNSC decision
to treat proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as their
'J1

'i)i;

means of delivery, as a threat to international peace and security. 123 It also considers
the illicit trafficking of WMD as a threat to international peace and security:
Gravely concerned by the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials, which
adds a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also
l peace and security.
. 124
.
.
poses a threat to mternat10na
In the PP sections, paragraphs are divided into three major categories, namely,
addressing the roles of the UNSC, matters regarding proliferation of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons as well as their means of delivery, and reminders of
states' obligation related to these matters. In the OP sections, the UNSC calls states to
implement the Resolution appropriately both at national and international levels.
The PSI statement of interdiction and UNSC Resolution 1540 share similar
issues, primarily ( 1) considering proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery as
a threat to international peace and security; 125 (2) taking appropriate and effective

122

"The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." U.N. Charter, supra note 26.
123
Masahiko Asada, Security Council Resolution 1540 to Combat WMD Terrorism:
Effectiveness and Legitimacy in International Legislation, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 303, 303
(2008).
124
UNSC Resolution 1540, supra note 27, pmbl, para. 9.
125
Id.; see also UNSC Resolution 1540, supra note 27, pmbl., para. I.
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actions to combat the illicit trafficking of WMD; 126 (3) enhancing coordination at all
levels to prevent the illicit trafficking of WMD; 127 ( 4) adopting and enforcing national
laws to prohibit the illicit trafficking of WMD; 128 and (5) indicating that all measures
should be consistent with national and international law. 129 Some issues, however, are
governed only in the PSI; for example, the type of proliferators are limited by the
UNSC Resolution only to non-state actors as maintained under UNSC Resolution
1267 (1999), while the PSI includes non-state actors and states of proliferation
concern. In terms of objectives, the PSI and UNSC Resolution 1540 both attempt to
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address concerns of regimes of terrorism and WMD.
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Although the UNSC Resolution 1540 was passed in 2004, one year after the
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adoption of the PSI, both refer to the UNSC Presidential Statement of 1992,

1
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highlighting all U.N. member states' general obligations concerning WMD:
The members of the Council underline the need for all Member States to fulfill
their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament; to prevent the
proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction; to avoid
excessive and destabilizing accumulations and transfer of arms; and to resolve
peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems concerning these
matters threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global
stability. 130
Similarly, this particular UNSC Presidential Statement is also referred to in all shipboarding agreements concluded by the United States with major flag-state countries

126

PSI statement of interdiction, supra note 19, first principle; see also UNSC Resolution
1540, supra note 27, pmbl., para. 4.
127
PSI statement of interdiction, supra note 19, chapeau; see also UNSC Resolution 1540,
supra note 27, pmbl., para. 10.
128
PSI statement of interdiction, supra note 19, third principle; see also UNSC Resolution
1540, supra note 27, operating para. 2.
129
PSI statement of interdiction, supra note 19, chapeau and fourth principle; see also UNSC
Resolution 1540, supra note 27, operating para. 10.
130
UNSC Resolution 1540, supra note 27.

before the issuance of UNSC Resolution 1540. 131 After such issuance, accordingly,
UNSC Resolution 1540 is included in a preamble paragraph in virtually all shipboarding agreements concluded by the United States with major flag-state countries. 132
The UNSC Resolution 1540 includes UNSC Resolutions 1267 and 1373
>n
~

(2001) in its preamble paragraphs. UNSC Resolution 1373 serves as a link between
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terrorists and WMD and UNSC Resolution 1267 maintains the U.N. list of terrorists or
terrorist groups. Within the UNSC system, Resolution 1267 is the door to the UNSC's
involvement in terrorism, based on its referral documents. Prior to UNSC Resolution
1267, the issue of terrorism remained at the UNGA level, which can be traced back to
its resolutions on measures to eliminate international terrorism, primarily Resolution
Numbers 49/60 (1994) and 46/51 (1991). The first declaration about terrorism in the
U.N. system was the UNGA Resolution 3034, concluded in its 2114th plenary

I'

meeting on December 18, 1972:

I'.i

... measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes
innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study of the
underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in
misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to
sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical
changes.
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Based on the above documents, it is conclusive that the PSI has its roots in 1972, or
even as far back as 1934, when the international community first discussed the issue of
terrorism.

131

See, e.g., Amendment to the Supplementary Arrangement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Panama to the Arrangement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Panama for
Support and Assistance from the United States Coast Guard for the National Maritime Service
of the Ministry of Government and Justice, May 12, 2004, KAY 6074.
132
See, e.g., SBA St. Vincent and the Grenadines, supra note 6.

Other international instruments compatible with the PSI motive are those of
international conventions concerning terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. To
date, fourteen international instruments on combating terrorism and four amendments
thereof have been adopted: the Tokyo Convention, 133 the Hague Convention, 134 the
Sabotage Convention, 135 the Convention on Protected Persons, 136 the Hostages
Convention, 137 the Convention on Nuclear Material, 138 the Protocol on Civil
Aviation, 139 the SUA Convention, 140 the Protocol on Fixed Platforms, 141 the
Convention on Plastic Explosives, 142 the Convention on Terrorist Bombings, 143 the
Convention on Terrorist Financing, 144 the Convention on Nuclear Terrorism, 145 and
the Beijing Convention. 146 The four amendments are the Amendment to the

133
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Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14,
1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941 [hereinafter Tokyo Convention].
134
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T.
1641.
135
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T 565.
136
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Dec. 28, 1973, 28 U.S.T 1975.
137
Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 ..
138
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, 1456 U.N.T.S.
1987 [hereinafter Convention on Nuclear Material].
139
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation (Feb. 24, 1988), 27 I.L.M. 627.
14
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter SUA Convention].
141
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf(Mar. 10, 1988), 27 I.L.M. 685.
142
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1,
1991, 2122 U.N.T.S. 359.
143
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Jan. 9, 1998), 37
l.L.M. 249.
144
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism(Jan. 10, 2000),
39 l.L.M. 268 [hereinafter Convention on Terrorist Financing].
145
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Apr. 13, 2005,
KA V 7909 [hereinafter Convention on Nuclear Terrorism].
146
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation,
(Sept. 10, 2010), 49 I.L.M. 1476.
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Convention on Nuclear Material,

147

the 2005 SUA Protocol, the 2005 SUA Protocol

on Continental Shelf, 148 and the 2010 Protocol to the Hague Convention. 149
Numerous international conventions on proliferation of WMD have been
passed, primarily the Protocol on Poisonous and Other Gases, 150 the NPT, the Treaty
on Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Ocean Floor, 151 the BWC, 152 and the CWC. 153
In addition, regional conventions on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
exist, for example, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 154 the ASEAN NWFZT,

155

and the

African NWFZT. 156 Although international conventions of these two regimes of
international law do not specifically refer to the PSI, nevertheless, they share common
concerns with the PSI motive, that is, stopping the illicit trafficking of WMD, in
particular by terrorists. For instance, according to the 2005 International Convention
for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,

147

2005 Amendments to the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,
July 8, 2005, KA V 8084.
148
2005 Protocol to the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Oct. 14, 2005, KA V 8049.
149
2010 Protocol Supplementary to the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft (Sept. 10, 2010), 49 I.L.M. 1476.
150
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571.
151
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of
Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11,
1971, 23 U.S.T. 701.
152
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26
U.S.T. 583 [hereinafter BWC].
153
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Jan. 13, 1993), 32 I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter
CWC].
154
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Feb.
14, 1967),61.L.M.521.
155
Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Dec. 15, 1995), 35 I.L.M. 635
[hereinafter ASEAN NWFZT].
156
African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Apr. 11, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 702.
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Recalling the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism
annexed to General Assembly resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994, in which,
inter alia, the States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their
unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as
criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed, including
those which jeopardize the friendly relations among States and peoples and
threaten the territorial integrity and security of States. 157
Furthermore, the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation highlights, among other issues, the danger of terrorism
to maritime safety:
':j
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Deeply concerned about the worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its
forms, which endanger or take innocent human lives, jeopardize fundamental
freedoms and seriously impair the dignity of human beings. 158
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Similarly, the NPT prohibits the transfer of WMD, as well as the illicit trafficking
thereof:
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not
in any way to assist, encourage, ,or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
.
. dev1ces.
.
159
or contro l over sue h weapons or exp los1ve
dev1ces,
In addition, the 1995 Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty on
disarmament of nuclear weapons indicates:
Determined to take concrete action, which will contribute to the progress
towards general and complete disarmament of nuclear weapons, and to the
promotion of international peace and security. 160
Finally, the 1980 Convention on Nuclear Material underscores the danger of nuclear
material:
157

Convention on Nuclear Terrorism, supra note 145, pmbl., para. 6.
SUA Convention, supra note 140, pmbl., para. 3; see also Glen Plant, The Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 39 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 27, 56 (1990) (discussing how the purpose of the convention was to combat
terrorism).
159
NPT, supra note 88, art. 1.
160
ASEAN NWFZT, supra note 155, pmbl., para. 2.
158

Desiring to avert the potential dangers posed by the unlawful taking and use of
nuclear material;
Convinced that offences relating to nuclear material are a matter of grave
concern and that there is an urgent need to adopt appropriate and effective
measures to ensure the prevention, detection and punishment of such
offences. 161
The above provisions relate to the PSI motive of stopping the illicit trafficking of
WMD. Under the provisions of the 1980 Convention on Nuclear Material, it is an
offense to take and use nuclear material unlawfully. Thus, the PSI motive attempts to
prevent such an offense.
The PSI motive is also a measure to prevent and combat terrorism. As any
other measures recognized under international law, the motive of the PSI is to
l'u1

minimize the threats and acts of terrorism. For example, the motive to combat illicit

:•

arms trafficking and suppress financing of terrorism was formalized by the
international community at the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Financing:
Recalling General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996,
paragraph 3, subparagraph (f), in which the Assembly called upon all States to
take steps to prevent and counteract, through appropriate domestic measures,
the financing of terrorists and terrorist organizations, whether such financing is
direct or indirect through organizations which also have or claim to have
charitable, social or cultural goals or which are also engaged in unlawful
activities such as illicit arms trafficking, drug dealing and racketeering,
including the exploitation of persons for purposes of funding terrorist
activities, and in particular to consider, where appropriate, adopting regulatory
measures to prevent and counteract movements of funds suspected to be
intended for terrorist purposes without impeding in any way the freedom of
legitimate capital movements and to intensify the exchange of information
concerning international movements of such funds. 162
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Convention on Nuclear Material, supra note 138, pmbl., paras. 3 & 4 (emphasis added).
Convention on Terrorist Financing, supra note 144, pmbl., para. 6.

65

The difference between the PSI motive and the financing of terrorism is the

,I
I
I

type of weapons addressed: the former addresses WMD while the latter is concerned
with conventional arms. Given the gravity of destruction that the former may cause
compared to the latter, it is difficult not to consider the PSI as a measure to prevent
and combat terrorism. In addition, the fact that more than ninety countries worldwide
have committed to support the PSI, including major flag-state countries, indicates that
the PSI motive is considered a common motive. In other words, the PSI has gained
international recognition as a measure to prevent and combat terrorism.
Use of Force and Anticipatory Self-Defense

International law is clear in prohibiting states from resorting to threat or force
in their international relations. This norm is recognized not only under treaty but also
by customary source of law. For instance, the U.N. Charter established such an
obligation for its members:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 163
Under this norm, the threat or use of force is not permissible against any state's
political independence or territorial integrity. The phrase "territorial integrity"
includes ships, aircraft, or any other property, over which a state can exercise its
jurisdiction. Thus, threat or use of force is not permissible against any state ships or
aircraft because of the territorial principle. Similarly, the I.C.J., in one of its judgment,
reiterates this norm as customary international law,
Thus the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations (hereinafter "the Declaration on Friendly Relations") provides
163

U.N. Ch arter, supra note 26, art. 2.
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that: "Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting
or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or
acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the
commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph
involve a threat or use of force." (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV),
24 October 1970.) The Declaration further provides that "no State shall
organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or
armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of
another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State" (ibid.). These
164
provisions are declaratory of customary international law.
As with other norms in international law, 165 the norm of use of force has its
exception. The U.N. Charter governs such exceptions, known as the right of self
defense:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security . 166
According to the foregoing article, a state may use force in the case of an armed
attack. Such use of force may be conducted individually or collectively, each with its
respective qualifications. On several occasions, the I.C.J. has reiterated that the
circumstances in which the right of self-defense may be resorted to include the
occurrence of an armed attack, proportionality, and necessity:
Despite having thus referred to attacks on vessels and aircraft of other
nationalities, the United States has not claimed to have been exercising
collective self-defence on behalf of the neutral States engaged in shipping in
the Persian Gulf; this would have required the existence of a request made to
164
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Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
2005 I.C.J. (Dec. 19), p. 168.
165
For example, the persistent objector rule of customary international law allows a state not
to follow customary norms, provided that the state has persistently objected to them.
166
U.N. Charter, supra note 26, art. 51.
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the United States "by the State which regards itself as the victim of an armed
attack" (I.CJ. Reports 1986, p. 105, para. 199). Therefore, in order to establish
that it was legally justified in attacking the Iranian platforms in exercise of the
right of individual self-defence, the United States has to show that attacks had
been made upon it for which Iran was responsible; and that those attacks were
of such a nature as to be qualified as "armed attacks" within the meaning of
that expression in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and as understood
in customary law on the use of force. As the Court observed in the case
concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, it is
necessary to distinguish "the most grave forms of the use of force (those
constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms" (I.CJ. Reports
1986, p. 101, para. 191 ), since "In the case of individual self-defence, the
exercise of this right is subject to the State concerned having been the victim of
an armed attack" (ibid., p. 103, para. 195). The United States must also show
that its actions were necessary and proportional to the armed attack made on it,
and that the platforms were a legitimate military target open to attack in the
exercise of self-defence. 167
These circumstances have acquired the status of customary international law as
confirmed by the I.CJ.:
The conditions for the exercise of the right of self-defence are well settled: as
the Court observed in its Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, "The submission of the exercise of the right of self-defence
to the conditions of necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary
international law" (I.CJ. Reports 1996 (1), p. 245, para. 41); and in the case
concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, the
Court referred to a specific rule "whereby self-defence would warrant only
measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond
to it" as "a rule well established in customary international law" (I.C.J. Reports
1986, p. 94, para. 176). 168
Although international law is clear in prohibiting the use of force, such is not
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the case in its exception, 169 particularly after the 9/11 attacks. 170 Terrorism has
influenced the international community's perception of self-defense. At present, this

167

Oil Platfonns (Islamic Republic oflran v. United States of America), Judgment, 2003 I.CJ.
(Nov. 6), p. 186, para. 51 ( emphasis added).
168
Id. para. 76.
169
For further discussion on exception to or breach of the regime of use of force, see
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 119-144 (Enzo Cannizzaro & Paola Palchetti eds., 2005).
17
For an extensive discussion on use of force after 9/11, see TOM RUYS, "ARMED ATTACK"
AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE U.N. CHARTER 447-472 (2010).
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dissertation submits there are two extensions to the original self-defense doctrine:
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anticipatory self-defense and pre-emptive self-defense. The difference between the
former and the latter lies primarily with the degree of the threat: the former is
imminent, and the latter is consequential. The international community, to some
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extent, recognizes anticipatory self-defense, provided that the threat of attack is
immediate and close. On the other hand, where pre-emptive self-defense is concerned,
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the views in the international community differ significantly. Joyner argues that preemptive self-defense is a wider interpretation of the supposedly narrow interpretation
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of self-defense.
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Furthermore, the practice of pre-emptive self-defense undermines
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not only the general rule of prohibition of use of force but also the regime of the
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United Nations, in particular the Security Council, in addressing threats to
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international peace and security. In practice, anticipatory self-defense includes, most
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notably, combating terrorism while pre-emptive self-defense covers, among other
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issues, the proliferation of WMD.
In the present case, the PSI represents both anticipatory and pre-emptive self-
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defense. One foot stands on combating terrorism while the other is on the measure of

l
,i,l,il11:

1111

1
111(11
, l1'11
l11,l1,,
'l

non-proliferation of WMD. Based on its intentions, two scenarios are applicable to the
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PSI. First, if the PSI is intended primarily as a measure to address non-proliferation of
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WMD, then it falls under pre-emptive self-defense; hence, it will be very difficult to
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obtain the international community's acceptance. However, if the PSI is designed to
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combat terrorism, including the possibility of acquiring WMD, then it not only
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supplements the work of the U .N. in preventing terrorism. Furthermore, the
international community's resistance is greater on the first rather than the second.
Concerning the second scenario, there are two types of use of force: first, that
of self-defense recognized by international law and, second, that of the PSI. In the first
type, the circumstances include but are not limited to armed attack, proportionality,
and necessity elements, while in the second type, not only does the PSI require the
first circumstance to be satisfied but it also has its own requirements, particularly in its
methods. If one were to analyze the PSI based on the first type, it would fall under
collective self-defense measures, in which terrorists carry out armed attacks of the
gravest character such as the U.S. 9/11, the U.K. 7/7 or the Spain bombings.
International law, by means of UNSC Resolution 1540, has condemned terrorism and
considers it a threat to international peace and security, and the international
community has agreed to combat any threat or act thereof. Thus, interdiction is not
only necessary but also proportionate to protect a state's security interests considered
essential against further imminent terrorist attacks.
In terms of methods, PSI interdiction must comply with national and
international law, which includes the norm of use of force governed in the first type.
PSI use of force follows certain additional requirements as indicated in all of its shipboarding agreements:
1. When carrying out the authorized actions under this Agreement, the use of
force shall be avoided except when necessary to ensure the safety of its
Security Force Officials and persons on board, or where the Officials are
obstructed in the execution of the authorized actions.
2. Any use of force pursuant to this Agreement shall not exceed the minimum
degree of force, which is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.

3. Nothing in this Agreement shall impair the exercise of the inherent right of
self-defense by Security Force Officials of either Party. 172
Accordingly, besides the right of self-defense circumstances recognized by
international law, PSI use of force must also consider safety of all persons on board
and meet the necessity and reasonableness elements. Hence, one may argue that the
PSI requirements in employing use of force are stricter than those derived from the
right of self-defense as governed by international law. According to this analysis, one
may contend that the PSI not only is in accordance with the prevailing rules of
international law, in particular the recognized right of self-defense, but also practices a
higher standard by adding its own requirements.
Another point in support of the PSI is the fact that it employs threat or use of
force in a limited fashion. It does not automatically exercise force against every ship
allegedly engaging in the illicit transfer of WMD. Instead, the PSI authorizes use of
force only if a ship refuses to be interdicted despite relevant consents having been
obtained. Once the consent of a flag state has been received, the status of the PSI is
similar to that of flag-state law enforcement. It is an exercise of jurisdiction in the

,,

state's territory rather than an attack on a state's territorial integrity or political
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independence. Furthermore, the PSI allows claims for damage, harm, loss, injury, or

I/

death arising from its interdiction, a condition that is only addressed if the use of force
of the first type is deemed to fail to meet the proportionality tests, among others.
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Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of Antigua and Barbuda Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials by Sea, art. 2, Apr. 26,
2010, KAY 9066 [hereinafter SBA Antigua and Barbuda].

Chapter 4
PSI Interdiction and Other Maritime Interdictions
Concept and Implementation
The concept of maritime interdiction under international law is complex
compared to land interdiction because the UNCLOS divides maritime areas into zones
with exclusive sovereignty, sovereign rights, and non-sovereign regimes. In land
interdiction, there is only one regime, that is, areas of sovereignty. The complexities of
maritime regimes are largely reflected in discussions of the 1975 Third U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea, particularly in the meetings of the 2nd committee
overseeing the division of maritime zones. 173 Although some commentators argue that
the international community successfully concluded their differences in the
UNCLOS, 174 a set oflegal conundrums concerning concept and implementation
remain. 175 For example, the question of a foreign military exercise in an exclusive
economic zone 176 has been debated since the UNCLOS was concluded in 1982. More
recently, maritime security issues have included terrorism and the 2010 Israel
interdiction of a flotilla, in which Turkey indicated its intention to seek the I.C.J. 's
. . on th e matter. 111
dec1s10n

173

Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, June 20-Aug. 29, 1974, vol. 2, at 95-307,

available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/diplomaticconferences/lawofthesea- l 982N 012.html
[hererinafter Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea].
174
FREEDOM OF SEAS, PASSAGE RIGHTS AND THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 7-9
(Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter Nordquist].
175
See I.A. Shearer, Problems ofJurisdiction and Law Enforcement against Delinquent
Vessels, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 343 (1986) (discussing jurisdiction of and law enforcement
issues in the UNCLOS).
176
Nordquist, supra note 174, at 235-95.
177
See, e.g., Turkey Suspends Israel Defence Ties over Gaza Aid Raid, BBC NEWS, Sept. 6,
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-l 4800305.
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Based on a number of issues, the UN CLOS governs more than half of the
maritime interdictions recognized under international law, for example, piracy and
slave trade. Other maritime interdictions, such as fisheries, drug trafficking, and
people smuggling, are further regulated by other international instruments. These
instruments are the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation; 178 the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation; 179 the 1995
Agreement to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks; 180 the 2001 International Plan of Action to Prevent,
Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing;

181

the 1988

Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances; 182
and the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 183
In general, as discussed in the previous chapter, PSI interdictions have three
elements: (1) common interests, (2) flag-state consent, and (3) use of force. These
three key elements will serve as the main tool for comparing PSI interdiction and other
maritime interdictions recognized under international law. The common interests
element lies with the motive while the remaining two elements deal with methods of
interdiction. This author submits that the PSI, both in motive and methods, shares
178

SUA Convention, supra note 140.
2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 7.
180
United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Dec. 4, 1995),
I.L.M. 1542 [hereinafter 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement].
181
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate lllegal, Unreported, and
Unregulated Fishing, Mar. 2, 2001 [hereinafter IAP IUU Fishing].
182
U.N. Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
(Dec. 19, 1988), 28 I.L.M. 497 [hereinafter U.N. Narcotics Convention].
183
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Nov. 15, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 353.
179

similarities with other maritime interdictions recognized under international law,
particularly under the UN CLOS and other international instruments.
UNCLOS-Based Maritime Interdictions
In the UN CLOS, interdictions may be conducted in seven types of maritime
zones: a territorial sea, a contiguous zone, straits used for international navigation,
archipelagic waters, an exclusive economic zone, a continental shelf, and the high
seas. Motives for interdictions also vary according to the zones, ranging from threats
against sovereignty to immigration to pollution. These zone-based interdictions rely on
each application of the right of navigation in the respective zones. For instance, in the
territorial sea, maritime interdiction is applicable only if a foreign vessel exercises its
innocent passage. Similarly, maritime interdiction can occur in straits used only for
international navigation, in which case a foreign vessel would be under transit passage
or in the high seas under the freedom of navigation rights. The following sections
include a discussion of each zone, its governed interdiction measures, and comparison
to PSI interdiction.
Territorial seas. Access to a coastal state's territorial sea by a foreign vessel is
viable only through innocent passage application. In other words, maritime
interdictions in a territorial sea may take place only when a foreign vessel is exercising
innocent passage. The UN CLOS provisions governing innocent passage are more
extensive compared to other passages addressing other zones. 184 As indicated in the
2nd Committee discussions, 185 one may argue that extensive provisions of innocent
passage are due to a territorial sea being recognized as an extension of a coastal state's
184

UN CLOS, supra note 33. See art. 19 for information on innocent passage, art. 4 for transit
passage, and art. 87 for freedom of high seas.
185
See Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, supra note 173, at 98-123.
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territory, with full sovereignty being exercised. As it is, unless otherwise provided, the
coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage
which is not innocent. 186
Motives for maritime interdiction in a territorial sea are governed generally in
Article 19, which defines the character of innocent passage. Maintaining the peace,
good order, and security of the coastal state is widely translated into activities ranging
from prohibition of use of force to immigration to fishing and environment, as well as
an open-ended provision that includes any other activity not related to the passage.
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace,
good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea if engages in
any of the following activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in
violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter
of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence
or security of the coastal. State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the
coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person
contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations of the coastal State;
(h) any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(i) the carrying out research or survey activities;
(k) any act claimed at interfering with any systems of communication or
any other facilities or installations of the coastal State;
187
(1) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.
Articles 20 and 22 allow coastal states to adopt laws and regulations primarily
in matters of navigation safety and environment. In terms of criminal jurisdiction, a

186
187

UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 25.
Id. art. 19.

coastal state, however, may only interdict a foreign vessel if two requirements are met:
first, a crime has occurred within the coastal state's territorial sea, and second, such a
crime meets one of three alternative conditions: it affects the coastal state's peace and
good order, a request is issued from the shipmaster or its flag state, or there is drug
trafficking. 188 The coastal state does not have civil jurisdiction of a foreign vessel
traversing its territorial sea. 189 Subject only to navigation safety, the coastal state in its
territorial sea has full discretion to determine methods to conduct interdiction,
including, but not limited to, use of force if necessary. 190
Compared to PSI interdiction, innocent passage interdiction differs in motive
and methods. In innocent passage interdiction, the motive should have a direct impact
on a coastal state's recognized interests. The PSI interdiction motive, on the other
hand, is based on a group of states' interests that may not have immediate effects on
the coastal state, although such interdiction takes place during an innocent passage.
Nevertheless, some commentators assert that the PSI motive can fall under the
UN CLOS motive of innocent passage interdiction. The PSI motive may be inserted in
the UNCLOS frame from domestic law of the coastal state to international
agreements. For instance, Beckman posits that, if the PSI-based motive is turned into
domestic law and violation of such a law constitutes a crime, the coastal state is
justified in conducting PSI interdiction in its territorial sea. 191 Under this hypothesis,
the PSI motive is a recognized motive under the UN CLOS and, thus, follows
188

Id. art. 27.
Id. art. 28.
190
Id. art. 27( 4 ).
191
Robert Beckman, Paper presented at the Proliferation Security Initiative in the Framework
of Maritime Security Symposium: Proliferation Security Initiative (Dec. 12, 2007) (on file
with the Directorate General of Law and International Treaties Library, Indonesian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs).
189
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UNCLOS provisions for innocent-passage interdiction. Another possibility is to make
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the PSI motive a recognized motive under international law, One way to do so is to
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criminalize the transport of WMD. 192
With regard to methods, both PSI and innocent passage interdictions permit the
use of force, in addition to the former allowing recognition of other states on its behalf
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to conduct interdiction. Under this methodology, an innocent-passage interdiction may
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be a PSI interdiction, provided that, among other things, consent of the coastal state
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has been obtained. If this is the case, then PSI interdiction under innocent-passage
interdiction should follow the UN CLOS provisions for innocent-passage interdiction.
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Additionally, although including the PSI motive in innocent-passage interdiction
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remains under discussion, the fact that PSI interdiction considers and respects the

111:"I

l

UN CLOS as the primary international law of the sea should be sufficient to deem that
PSI interdiction should follow the UN CLOS provision on innocent-passage
interdiction. Another difference between PSI interdiction and innocent-passage
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interdiction is that the latter does not require flag-state consent to interdict a foreign
vessel. 193 Nevertheless, given the assumption that a PSI interdiction may take the form
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of an innocent-passage interdiction, the PSI interdiction may occur without the flagstate consent.
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Contiguous zones. The UNCLOS governs maritime interdiction in contiguous
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zones for customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary infringements that occur in a
territorial sea:
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1. In zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as contiguous zone, the
coastal State may exercise the control necessary to:
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(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea. 194
In other words, the contiguous-zone interdiction motive is subject to innocentpassage interdiction motives for customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary
infringements. The coastal state, however, cannot exercise criminal and civil
jurisdictions for an act occurring in a contiguous zone. With regards to method,
interdiction in a contiguous zone follows innocent-passage interdiction. Use of force is
permissible with consideration of navigation safety.
With contiguous zones being an extension of territorial sea, contiguous-zone
interdictions are similar to innocent-passage interdictions, but differ in both motives
and methods from PSI interdiction. Nevertheless, unlike innocent-passage interdiction,
PSI interdiction cannot be conducted under contiguous-zone interdiction because the
UN CLOS specifically limits motives to customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary
infringements. Although PSI interdiction cannot be conducted under contiguous-zone
interdiction, PSI interdiction may take place within the contiguous zone under the
regime of hot pursuit. 195 This argument may be relevant in a situation in which the hot
pursuit is conducted for a crime that occurred in a territorial sea, when possible
motives of such a crime may include that of the PSI.
Straits used for international navigation. Interdiction in the strait used for
international navigation is based on the maritime zones delimiting such a strait. The
UNCLOS recognizes two possible delimitations for straits used for international
navigation: a strait connecting high seas/an exclusive economic zone with high
194
195

Id. art. 33.
Id. art. 111; see App. B for text.

seas/another exclusive economic zone and a strait connecting high seas/an exclusive
economic zone with a territorial sea. For the first type of strait, the maritime
interdiction is subject to the regime of transit passage. For the second, taking into
account the element of the territorial sea, it is subject to of the regime of innocent
passage. Hence, given the possible delimitations of a strait used for international
navigation, a foreign vessel may take two passages, that is, transit or innocent,
according to the zones traversed.
For the first type of strait, in addition to navigation safety, environmental
protection, customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary reasons as mentioned in Article
42, motives for interdiction are limited to that of transit passage:
1. Ships and aircraft, while exercising the right of transit passage, shall:
(a) proceed without delay through or over the strait;
(b) refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of State bordering the
strait, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(c) refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal
modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary
by force majeure or by distress;
(d) comply with other relevant provisions of this Part. 196
Motives for the second type of strait are similar to that of innocent passage
because provisions thereof apply mutatis mutandis. 197 Although motives for both types
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of straits differ, they do not affect the methods of interdiction. In other words, methods
for transit-passage interdiction are relatively similar to those for innocent passage. It
should be noted, however, that the regime of innocent passage for straits used for
international navigation is slightly different than the regime of innocent passage for a
territorial sea. In the former, suspension is not allowed, while in the latter the coastal
196

197

Id. art. 39.
Id. art. 45.
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state may temporarily suspend innocent passage. The effect of this no-suspension
provision is that the chance of the coastal state using force to investigate infringements
is greater in the strait used for international navigation than it is in the territorial sea,
where other means are available, such as temporary suspension based on security
issues.
Under the innocent-passage interdiction regime, PSI interdiction may be
conducted in the second type of strait. On the other hand, a coastal state or other state
under the PSI cannot interdict a foreign vessel traversing under the transit-passage
regime due to the limited motives specified. Similar to contiguous-zone interdiction,
however, PSI interdiction may take place in the first type of strait under the regime of
hot pursuit commenced in a territorial sea. As in any other maritime zones, navigation
safety is a key element in conducting hot pursuit or any other recognized activity in
the UNCLOS.
Archipelagic waters. Maritime interdiction in straits used for international
navigation is subject to two types of passages: innocent passage for a territorial sea
and archipelagic sea-lane passage for archipelagic waters. Both passage types are
mandatory, 198 but archipelagic states can designate lanes for the latter. 199 Failing to
prescribe archipelagic sea-lane passage may give rise to the use oflanes for
international navigation without the consent of the archipelagic state. 200 In theory,
innocent passage in archipelagic waters follows the regime for a territorial sea201 while
the regime of archipelagic sea-lane passage is identical to that for a strait used for

198

199
200
201

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

arts. 52( 1) & 53(2).
art. 53(1 ).
art. 53(12).
art. 52.

international navigation connecting a high sea or an exclusive economic zone to
another high sea or an exclusive economic zone, hence the regime of transit
passage. 202 Subject to archipelagic sea-lane passage, sovereignty over its archipelagic
waters is exclusive to an archipelagic state:
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by
the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 4 7, described as
archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as
well as their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. 203
Motives for interdiction in archipelagic states are based on the zones, that is, innocent
passage for a territorial sea and transit passage for archipelagic waters.
Yet, although transit passage provides fewer motives compared to innocent
passage, in practice, transit passage in archipelagic waters is frequently treated as
innocent passage, thus the innocent-passage motive applies. This condition has a valid
reason. Archipelagic states would argue that treating archipelagic sea-lane passage like
a foreign vessel traversing under the transit-passage regime would undermine the very
concept of the archipelagic state, a designation meant to ensure that no enclaves of
islands can jeopardize its territorial and political integrity. For example, a foreign
vessel could conduct intelligence acts during the transit passage and get away easily
because there is no specific provision governing such acts in the UNCLOS.
Furthermore, the sovereignty of archipelagic waters is identical to that of a
territorial sea, 204 except for existing agreements, traditional fishing rights, and existing
submarine cables that must be recognized by the archipelagic state.
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inconsistency is obvious: the UNCLOS treats an archipelagic sea-lane located in
archipelagic waters under the transit-passage regime, yet it recognizes an archipelagic
state's exclusive sovereignty in the archipelagic waters. Thus in practice, as stated
previously, although a foreign vessel may claim that it is exercising transit passage by
traversing through an archipelagic sea lane, the archipelagic state may conduct
innocent-passage interdiction based on its exclusive sovereignty over the archipelagic
waters.
As with innocent-passage interdiction, an archipelagic state may determine its
own methods, including but not limited to use of force and having other states
participate, without flag-state consent to interdict foreign vessels in the archipelagic
waters. Moreover, the regime of passage in archipelagic waters cannot be suspended;
the coastal state may temporarily suspend innocent passage, but the archipelagic sealane passage that applies to the transit-passage regime cannot be suspended at all.
Given the premise that innocent-passage interdiction may include PSI interdiction, it
can be assumed that the coastal state or another state with the consent of the coastal
state may conduct PSI interdiction in its archipelagic waters.
Exclusive economic zones. There are two groups of motives for maritime
interdiction in exclusive economic zones. The first is that of natural resources
management:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the
waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and
with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and
exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from water,
currents and winds;

(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this
Convention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and
structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention. 206
The second group of motives for interdiction and its enforcement in exclusive
economic zone are based on Article 110, regarding the right of visit in the high seas, 207
which will be discussed in detail in the following section on the high seas. The
iI

inclusion of high seas under freedom of navigation for a motive of interdiction in
exclusive economic zones opens access to the interests of other states. That is, in this
particular type of zone, maritime interdiction can be conducted by any state, with the
'I)
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exception of those motives stipulated in Article 56 that belong exclusively to coastal
states. A coastal state, on the other hand, can exercise both motives set out in Articles
56 and 110. In exercising interdiction in an exclusive economic zone, other states must
comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal state. 208
Enforcements for the first group of motives are reflected in Article 73:
1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore,
exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive
economic zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest
and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with
the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention.
2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the
posting of reasonable bond or other security.
3. Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in
the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence
of agreements to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other form of
corporal punishment.
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Id. art. 58(2).
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4. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State shall
promptly notify the flag State, through appropriate channels, of the action
taken and of any penalties subsequently imposed.
Methods of interdiction in an exclusive economic zone may employ the use of force
and do not require prior consent of the flag state. The difference between methods of
interdiction under Articles 73 and 110 is that the latter requires compensation if the
motives prove to be unfounded. Another state's interdiction in the exclusive economic
zone, according to Article 110, does not require a coastal state's consent, which is
necessary for interdiction under Article 73.
)~

Aside from the difference in motives, under both Article 73 and Article 110,
interdictions in exclusive economic zones have similar methods to PSI interdiction,
particularly methods based on Article 110, including its compensation element. PSI
interdiction, however, has stronger requirements, for example, flag-state consent. This
requirement is, of course, acceptable considering that the motive of PSI interdiction is
not listed in Article 110 motives. In exclusive economic zones, PSI interdiction may
be a stand-alone interdiction, requiring no coastal-state consent, provided that prior
flag-state consent has been obtained. PSI interdiction as an extension of innocent-
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passage interdiction may also occur in an exclusive economic zone under the hotpursuit regime.

Continental shelves. Except in the case of a natural prolongation condition, a
continental shelf covering the seabed and subsoil areas spans a distance of 200 miles
from where a territorial sea is measured. 209 Hence, a continental shelf may constitute
the areas of a territorial sea, a contiguous zone, an exclusive economic zone, and in

209

Id. art. 76( 1).
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some rare cases, high seas. 210 As such, although the locations of infringements are
seabed and subsoil areas, enforcement begins at the surface. To this end, coastal-state
motives for interdiction range from the surface to seabed and subsoil areas. Similar to
an exclusive economic zone, the motives for interdiction in a continental shelf are
limited to exploiting natural resources. The difference is only in the location of the
resources:
1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for
the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 are exclusive in the sense that if the
coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural
resources, no one may undertake these activities without the express
consent of the coastal State.
3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not de~end on
occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation. 11
Methods of interdiction for infringement of a continental shelf follow those for an
exclusive economic zone set out in Article 73, including, but not limited to, use of
force, participation of other states, and requiring no flag-state consent. It should be
noted, however, that because infringements based on continental shelf motives may
take place in high seas, its enforcement might conflict with recognized freedom of
navigation in such areas.
To date, no record indicates that the transport of WMD has been conducted by
means of a submarine vessel. Furthermore, PSI interdiction cannot be carried out
under continental-shelf motives. With regard to the methods, interdiction on a
continental shelf has similar elements with the PSI, except for flag-state consent,
which is required under PSI interdiction.
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Id. art. 78.
Id. art. 77.
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High seas. The UN CLOS recognizes two groups of motives in high-seas
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interdiction: those of the flag state and common interests. The motives for the first
group are based on the laws and regulations of the flag state, including criminal and
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civil jurisdictions. The general rule of the first group is that only the flag state or
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another state with prior consent of the flag state can conduct interdiction on the high
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seas of its vessels. This rule is based on the principle of exclusive jurisdiction of the
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flag state:
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1. Every State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in
administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.
2. In particular every State shall:
(a) maintain register of ships containing the names and particulars of ships
flying its flag, except those which are excluded from generally accepted
international regulations on account of their small size; and
(b) assume jurisdiction under its internal law over each ship flying its flag
and its master, officers and crew in respect of administrative, technical
. 1 matters concernmg
. the sh"ip. 212
and socia
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The second group of motives for interdiction, based on common interests,
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includes slave trade,
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piracy,
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drug trafficking,
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illegal broadcasting,
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the methods of interdiction are identical to those for innocent-passage interdiction,
including use of force, another state's participation, and no compensation elements.
On the other hand, except for drug trafficking, fisheries, and pollution stipulated in
11
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94(1 ).
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Articles 108, 118, and 195, the methods of interdiction based on the second group of
motives are governed in Article 110:
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a
warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a ship
entitled to complete immunity in accordance with articles 95 and 96, is not
justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting
that:
(a) the ship is engaged in piracy;
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade;
(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of
the warship has jurisdiction under article 109;
(d) the ship is without nationality; or
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in
reality, of the same nationality as the warship.
2. In the cases provided for in paragraph 1, the warship may proceed to verify
the ship's right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under the
command of an officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the
documents have been checked, it may proceed to a further examination on
board the ship, which must be carried out with all possible consideration.
3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded
has not committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated for any
loss or damage that may have been sustained.

The primary difference between the methods of interdiction in the first and second
groups of motives is that the latter mandates compensation should the motives not be
proven.
Of all the maritime zones governed by the UN CLOS, the high seas are the only
area in which PSI participants can exercise interdiction with less controversy, 220
although an exclusive economic zone and a continental shelf share similar high-seas
freedom of navigation. The reason is primarily that flag-state consent is required in
PSI interdiction. For the first group of motives, the element of flag-state consent not
only opens all access to jurisdiction, in which the PSI motive can be inserted, but also

22

°For discussion of a possible jurisdictional link between piracy and the PSI, see Daniel H.

Joyner, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation, and
International Law, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 507, 540 (Summer 2005).
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allows other states to participate in the interdiction. In general, methods of interdiction
in the high seas are similar to PSI interdiction, except for the first group of motives
that require no element of compensation if the motives are unfounded.
Other Instruments Based on Maritime Interdictions
Motives. The UNCLOS governs almost all motives for maritime interdictions.
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These motives include piracy, fisheries, drug trafficking, and human trafficking. In

1}.

t.

'I
k,

fact, some of the instruments relevant to maritime interdictions refer to the UN CLOS,
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among others, the IAP IUU Fishing Agreement, 221 and the 1995 Fish Stocks
Agreement. 222 Although the 1988 U.N. Narcotics Convention, the 2000 UNTOC, and
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the 2002 Protocol to UNCTOC 223 do not specifically refer to the UNCLOS, they make
reference to the international law of the sea concerning activities in maritime zones, 224
despite the fact that the UNCLOS governs drug trafficking and human trafficking or
slavery225 in Article 108 and Article 99, respectively. The 1988 SUA also does not

221

IAP IUU Fishing, supr~ note 181, pt. 4, para, 10: "States should give full effect to relevant
norms of international law, in particular as reflected in the 1982 Convention, in order to
prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing."
222
1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 180, pmbl., para. 1: "Recalling the relevant
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982."
223
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Nov. 15, 2000), 40
I.L.M. 384 [hereinafter 2002 Protocol to UNTOC].
224
U. N. Narcotics Convention, supra note 182, art. 17, para. 1: "The parties shal I co-operate
to the fullest extent possible to suppress illicit traffic by sea, in conformity with international
law of the sea"; see also 2002 Protocol to UNTOC, id. art. 7: "State Parties shall cooperate to
the fullest extent possible to prevent and suppress the smuggling of migrants by sea, in
accordance with the international law of the sea."
225
For discussions on human trafficking as a modem form of slavery, see United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC Report on Human Trafficking Exposes Modem Form of
Slavery, Feb. 12, 2009, available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/ unodc-reporton-human-trafficking-exposes-modem-form-of-slavery-.html.
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refer to the UN CLOS. Its 2005 Protocol 226 does, however, despite the fact that the
UN CLOS does not include terrorism as a motive for interdiction. Thus, these
instruments not only complement the UNCLOS but also recognize its primacy over
them. The PSI, in this respect, is similar to the 1988 SUA and its 2005 Protocol in
recognizing the primacy of the UNCLOS. 227
In addition to being included in or referring to the UNCLOS, motives in these
instruments have another item in common: interest that constitutes international
concern. In the 1988 SUA and its 2005 Protocol, terrorist acts and the transport of
Biological, Chemical and Nuclear (BCN) weapons and technology constitute threats to
international peace and security. 228 The 2001 International Plan of Action on Illegal,
Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing and the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, in
particular, indicate irresponsible fishing as a serious concern of the international
community. 229 Drug trafficking, addressed in the 1988 U.N. Narcotics Convention,
and the smuggling of migrants, addressed in the 2002 Protocol to the UNTOC
Convention, are also international concerns. 230 Similarly, the international community
considers the PSI motive, the illicit transfer of weapons of mass destruction related to
terrorism, an international concern. This concern was encapsulated primarily through
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2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 7, pmbl., para. 9: "Bearing in mind the importance of the
United Nations on the Law of the Sea done in Montego Bay, on 10 December 1982, and of the
customary international law."
227
See, e.g., SBA Antigua and Barbuda, supra note 172, pmbl., para. 11: "Reaffirming the
importance of customary international law of the sea as reflected in the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea."
228
See 2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 7, pmbl., para. 2: "Acknowledging that terrorists acts
threaten international peace and security"; see also acts qualified as offenses as governed in
art. 5, para. 5( 1)(b ). See App. C for text.
229
See 2001 IAP IUU Fishing, supra note 181, pt. 1, para. 2. See App. D for text.
230
See 1998 U.N. Narcotics Convention, supra note 10, pmbl., paras. 4, 9, & 10. See App. E.
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UNSC Resolution 1540, which indicates the PSI motive is a threat to international
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peace and secunty.
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Another similarity among these motives is that states have incorporated them
into their national laws. Thus, states have designated IUU fishing, drug trafficking,
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and human trafficking as crimes. For example, the European Union has regulated drug

l,i

trafficking through its Council Framework Decision Number 2004/757/JH; 232 human
trafficking through Directive 2011/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its
victims (which replaced Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA); 233 and IUU
I

fishing in Council Regulation (EC) No. 1005/2008 and Commission Regulation (EC)
No. I 010/2009, among others. In the United States, IUU fishing is regulated in the
l

Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, 234 among others; drug trafficking is
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governed under Title 21 of the United States Code (U.S.C.), the Controlled Substance
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Act; 235 and human trafficking is addressed in the Victims of Trafficking and Violence
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UNSC Resolution 1540, supra note 27, pmbl., paras. 8 & 9: "Gravely concerned by the
threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors such as those identified in the United
Nations list established and maintained by the Committee established under Security Council
resolution 1267 and those to whom resolution 1373 applies, may acquire, develop, traffic in or
use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery ... ; Gravely
concerned by the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and
their means of delivery, and related materials, which adds a new dimension to the issue of
proliferation of such weapons and also poses a threat to international peace and security."
232
Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA, Oct. 25,
2004, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ .do?uri=OJ :L:2004:335 :0008 :0011 :EN :PDF.
233
European Parliament, Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, and
Protecting Victims, Dec. 14, 2010, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file
.jsp?id=5849482.
234
U.S. Department of Commerce, Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act, May 2007, available at http://www.nero.noaa.gov/sfd/MSA_amended
_20070112_FINAL.pdf.
235
U.S. Controlled Substances Act, Oct. 27, 1970, available at
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/ 21 cfr/21 use/index.html.
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Protection Act of 2000, the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2003, the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, and the
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, among others. 236
Nevertheless, the PSI motive has not yet been codified in this manner. Not all PSI
participants have incorporated the illicit transfer of WMD per se as a crime under their
national laws. In the United States, the lead state on the PSI, the PSI motive is
regulated primarily by Executive Order No. 12938, dated November 14, 1994, 237
while in the European Union, the PSI motive currently remains only in the form of
resolutions or opinions, for example, the Communication on Nuclear Non
Proliferation Com/2009/0143. 238
Although not all PSI-participating states have incorporated the PSI motive and
methods into their national laws, a recent international development related to the
illicit transfer of WMD has indicated change. As of July 28, 2010, the 2005 SUA
Protocol entered into force after the Republic of Nauru deposited its instrument of
ratification to the IMO on April 29, 2010. The Republic of Nauru's ratification is the
12th instrument of ratification submitted to the IMO, and the Protocol entered into
force ninety days after the 12th instrument of ratification was deposited. By June 25,
2011, there were twenty contracting states to the 2005 SUA Protocol, up from a total
of eighteen signatory states in 2006-2007. What is interesting concerning the status of
this particular protocol is that not all major maritime powers included in PSI-

236

U.S. Department of State, U.S. Laws on Trafficking in Persons, available at http://www
.state.gov/g/tip/laws/.
237
Exec. Order No. 12,938, 3 C.F.R 950 (Nov. 14, 1994) .
238
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament, Mar. 26, 2009, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0 l 43 :FIN :EN :HTML.
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,..participating states have submitted their reservations, including the United States, the
United Kingdom, Australia, and France. Several major flag-state countries, however,
have acceded, accepted, or ratified the 2005 SUA Protocol, including Panama on May
25, 2011; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on October 3, 2010; and the Marshall
Islands on July 28, 2010.
Unlike other methods established as legally binding norms, the PSI method is
voluntary in character. PSI participants, including those who have concluded shipboarding agreements with the United States, still have choices concerning how to
respond to a PSI-based request: either accept or deny flag-state consent or third-party
participation. Nevertheless, given the recent entry into force of the 2005 SUA
Protocol, stopping the illicit transfer of WMD has become an international obligation,
at least for the twenty contracting states of the Protocol.

Methods. Methods of interdiction in UN CLOS regimes and other international
instruments are similar, primarily in recognizing flag-state consent and limited use of
force. This similarity is largely due to other international instruments, as noted earlier,
either complementing or referring to the UN CLOS. In the 2005 SUA Protocol, the act
of boarding a foreign ship requires its flag-state consent:
5. Whenever law enforcement or other authorized officials of a State Party
("the requesting Party") encounter a ship flying the flag or displaying
marks of registry of another State Party ("the first party") located seaward
of any State's territorial sea, and the requesting Party has reasonable
grounds to suspect that the ship or a person on board the ship has been, or
is about to be involved in the commission of an offence set forth in article
3, 3 bis, 3ter or 3quater, and the requesting Party desires to board,
(a) it shall request, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 that the first
Party confirm the claim of nationality, and
(b) if nationality confirmed, the requesting Party shall ask the first Party
(hereinafter referred to as "the flag State") for authorization to board
and to take appropriate measures with regard to that ship which may

92
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include stopping, boarding and searching the ship, its cargo and persons
on board, and questioning the persons on board in order to determine if
an offence set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has been, is being
or is about to be committed, and
(c) the flag State shall either:
(i) authorize the requesting Party to board and to take appropriate
measures set out in subparagraph (b ), subject to any conditions it
may impose in accordance with paragraph 7; or
(ii) conduct the boarding and search with its own law enforcement or
other officials; or
(iii)conduct the boarding and search together with the requesting Party,
subject to any conditions it may impose in accordance with
paragraph 7; or
(iv)decline to authorize a boarding and search.
The requesting Party shall not board the ship or take measures set out in
subparagraph (b) without the express authorization of the flag State. 239

I

Similarly, in the 1988 Narcotics Convention, flag-state consent is required for
boarding a foreign ship:
3. A Party which has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel exercising
freedom of navigation in accordance with international law, and flying the
flag or displaying marks of registry of another Party is engaged in illicit
traffic may so notify the flag State, request confirmation of registry and, if
confirmed, request authorizationfrom the flag State to take appropriate
measures in regard to that vessel.
4. In accordance with paragraph 3 or in accordance with treaties in force
between them or in accordance with any agreement or arrangement
otherwise reached between those Parties, the flag State may authorize the
requesting State to, inter alia:
a) Board the vessel;
b) Search the vessel;
c) If evidence of involvement in illicit traffic is found, take approforiate
2 0
action with respect to the vessel, persons and cargo on board.
In the 2002 Protocol on the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air,
supplementing the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime,
flag-state consent is also mandated:
2. A State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel
exercising freedom of navigation in accordance with international law and
239
240

2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 7, art. 8(5).
1988 U.N. Narcotics Convention, supra note 182, art. 17(3).
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flying the flag or displaying the marks of registry of another State Party is
engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea may so notify the flag State,
request confirmation of registry and, if confirmed, request authorization
from the flag State to take appropriate measures with regard to that vessel.
The flag State may authorize the requesting State, inter alia:
(a) To board the vessel;
(b) To search the vessel; and
(c) If evidence is found that the vessel is engaged in the smuggling of
migrants by sea, to take appropriate measures with respect to the vessel
and persons and cargo on board, as authorized by the flag State. 241
On the other hand, the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement allows for a strong mechanism
with respect to maritime interdiction. Unless otherwise provided under subregional or
regional organization or arrangement, 242 the procedure of interdiction set out under the
1995 Fish Stock Agreement will prevail. 243 Both procedures, subregional or regional
organization or arrangement and the 1995 Fish Stock Agreement, waive the flag-state
consent in the case of interdiction by other state parties:
1. In any high seas area covered by a subregional or regional fisheries
management organization or arrangement, a State Party which is a
member of such organization or a participant in such arrangement may,
through its duly authorized inspectors, board and inspect, in accordance
with paragraph 2, fishing vessels flying the flag of another State Party to
this Agreement, whether or not such State Party is also a member of the
organization or a participant in the arrangement, for the purpose of
ensuring compliance with conservation and management measures for
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks established by that
·
·
orgamzat10n
or arrangement. .. M4
5. Where, following a boarding and inspection, there are clear grounds for
believing that a vessel has engaged in any activity contrary to the
conservation and management measures referred to in paragraph 1, the
inspecting State shall, where appropriate, secure evidence and shall
promptly notify the flag State of the alleged violation.
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2002 Protocol to UNTOC, supra note 223, art. 8(2).
See App. F for the major fishery management organizations in the world.
243
See 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 180, art. 22, for basic procedure for boarding
and inspection pursuant to Article 2 I. See App. G for text.
244 d
Ii . art. 21 (I).
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6. The flag State shall respond to the notification referred to in paragraph 5
within three working days of its receipt, or such other period as may be
prescribed in procedures established in accordance with paragraph 2, and
shall either:
(a) fulfill, without delay, its obligations under article 19 to investigate and,
if evidence so warrants, take enforcement action with respect to the
vessel, in which case it shall promptly inform the inspecting State of
the results of the investigation and of any enforcement action taken; or
(b) authorize the inspecting State to investigate. 245
When compared to the above articles, the PSI method follows most procedures
recognized in addressing the illicit transfer of WMD, drug trafficking, and human
trafficking concerning boarding a foreign ship, that is, requiring prior flag-state
consent. Under certain arrangements, however, international law allows maritime
interdiction of a foreign ship without flag-state consent, as indicated in the fisheries
interdiction under the 1995 Fish Stock Agreement. 246 To a certain extent,
arrangements may range from appointment of inspectors to special marking of an
enforcement ship, which function as waivers of flag-state consent. Without proper
arrangements, flag-state consent might still be required. Nevertheless, even with
proper arrangements, the flag state may still deny the request for boarding consent. In
any event, under international law, flag-state consent remains a fundamental
requirement of boarding a foreign ship.
Comparable to the requirement of flag-state consent, the PSI shares the limited
nature of use of force in maritime interdiction recognized by other maritime
interdictions, such as the application of safeguards provisions, conveyed inter alia in,
the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement,
(f) avoid the use of force except when and to the degree necessary to
ensure the safety of the inspectors and where the inspectors are
i:

245

Id. art. 21(5) & (6).

246

A similar arrangement is also apparent in RFMOs; see GUILFOYLE, supra note 8, at 106.
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obstructed in the execution of their duties. The degree of force used
shall not exceed that reasonably required in the circumstances. 247
The 1988 U.N. Narcotics Convention,
''Ii!'!
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Where action is taken pursuant to this article, the Parties concerned
shall take due account of the need not to endanger the safety of life at
sea, the security of the vessel and the cargo or to prejudice the
commercial and legal interests of the flag State or any other interested
State. 248
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The 2002 Protocol to UNTOC,
1. Where a State Party takes measures against a vessel in accordance with
article 8 of this Protocol, it shall:
(a) Ensure the safety and humane treatment of the persons on board;
(b) Take due account of the need not to endanger the security of the vessel
or its cargo;
(c) Take due account of the need not to prejudice the commercial or legal
interests of the flag State or any other interested State;
(d) Ensure, within available means, that any measure taken with regard to
the vessel is environmentally sound.
2. Where the grounds for measures taken pursuant to article 8 of this Protocol
prove to be unfounded, the vessel shall be compensated for any loss or
damage that may have been sustained, provided that the vessel has not
committed any act justifying the measures taken.
3. Any measure taken, adopted or implemented in accordance with this
chapter shall take due account of the need not to interfere with or to affect:
(a) The rights and obligations and the exercise of jurisdiction of coastal
States in accordance with the international law of the sea; or
(b) The authority of the flag State to exercise jurisdiction and control in
administrative, technical and social matters involving the vessel.
4. Any measure taken at sea pursuant to this chapter shall be carried out only
by warships or military aircraft or by other ships or aircraft clearly marked
and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that
effect. 249
The 2005 SUA Protocol,
9. When carrying out the authorized actions under this article, the use of force
shall be avoided except when necessary to ensure the safety of its officials
and persons on board, or where the officials are obstructed in the execution
of the authorized actions. Any use of force pursuant to this article shall not
247
248
249

1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 180, art. 22(1)(f).
1988 U.N. Narcotics Convention, supra note 182, art. 17(5).
2002 Protocol to UNTOC, supra note 223, art. 9.
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exceed the minimum degree of force which is necessary and reasonable in
the circumstances.
10. Safeguards:
(a) Where a State Party takes measures against a ship in accordance with
this article, it shall:
(i) take due account of the need not to endanger the safety of life at
sea;
(ii) ensure that all persons on board are treated in a manner which
preserves their basic human dignity, and in compliance with the
applicable provisions of international law, including international
human rights law;
(iii) ensure that a boarding and search pursuant to this article shall be
conducted in accordance with applicable international law;
(iv) take due account of the safety and security of the ship and its
cargo;
(v) take due account of the need not to prejudice the commercial or
legal interests of the flag State;
(vi) ensure, within available means, that any measure taken with
regard to the ship or its cargo is environmentally sound under the
circumstances;
(vii) ensure that persons on board against whom proceedings may be
commenced in connection with any of the offences set forth in
article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater are afforded the protections of
paragraph 2 of article 10, regardless of location;
(viii) ensure that the master of a ship is advised of its intention to
board, and is, or has been, afforded the opportunity to contact the
ship's owner and the flag State at the earliest opportunity; and
(ix) take reasonable efforts to avoid a ship being unduly detained or
delayed.
(b) Provided that authorization to board by a flag State shall not per se give
rise to its liability, States Parties shall be liable for any damage, harm or
loss attributable to them arising from measures taken pursuant to this
article when:
(i) the grounds for such measures prove to be unfounded, provided
that the ship has not committed any act justifying the measures
taken; or
(ii) such measures are unlawful or exceed those reasonably required
in light of available information to implement the provisions of
this article.
State Parties shall provide effective recourse in respect of such damage,
harm or loss.
(c) Where a State Party takes measures against a ship in accordance with
this Convention, it shall take due account of the need not to interfere
with or to affect:
(i) the rights and obligations and the exercise of jurisdiction of
coastal States in accordance with the international law of the sea;
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or
(ii) the authority of the flag State to exercise jurisdiction and control
in administrative, technical and social matters involving the ship.
(d) Any measure taken pursuant to this article shall be carried out by law
enforcement or other authorized officials from warships or military
aircraft, or from other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable
as being on government service and authorized to that effect and,
notwithstanding articles 2 and 2bis, the provisions of this article shall
apply.
(e) For the purposes of this article "law enforcement or other authorized
officials" means uniformed or otherwise clearly identifiable members
of law enforcement or other government authorities duly authorized by
their government. For the specific purpose of law enforcement under
this Convention, law enforcement or other authorized officials shall
provide appropriate government-issued identification documents for
examination by the master of the ship upon boarding. 250
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Thus, the use of force in PSI maritime interdiction follows limited use of force in other
maritime interdictions recognized under international law. 251
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2005 SUA Protocol, supra note 7, art. 8.
See Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), Judgment, 1998 I.CJ. (Dec. 4), p. 466, para. 81.
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Chapter 5
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Status of the PSI under International Law
First considered or claimed to be a foreign-policy initiative, the PSI has
transformed into a norm of international law by adding the new motive of illicit
trafficking of WMD to the list of maritime interdiction practices conducted
worldwide. Analysis of this new motive addresses its object and purpose, methods,
and designs, and argues that the PSI neither contradicts nor violates relevant
provisions of international law, in particular the international law of the sea enshrined
in the UNCLOS. Comparison with other maritime interdictions recognized under
international law has also revealed that PSI interdictions have several similar practices
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to other maritime interdictions, including but not limited to requirements of flag-state
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consent, compensation, and use of force. In addition, that ninety-eight countries have
voluntarily agreed to conduct PSI interdictions is further evidence of the PSI
developing as a norm under international law. Considering these premises, it is
I

difficult not to consider PSI as a developing norm under international law.
The discussions thus far have covered an analysis of the PSI, its compatibility
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with international law, and a comparison of the PSI with other maritime interdictions
recognized under international law. The following discussion addresses the PSI as a
developing norm based on the status of the PSI under international law. The
underlying general theme concerning the status of the PSI is whether it gives rise to
international legal rights and obligations. The scope of international legal rights and
obligations extends not only to PSI-participating states but also to third parties and the
international community. In addressing the general theme, this discussion is framed in

·-two parts. The first part is analysis of the PSI as unilateral acts, including legal force
and relevant international legal rights and obligations. The second part situates the PSI
within sources of international law enshrined in Article 38 of the I.C.J. Statute.
The rationale behind the first part is to detach the PSI from its current forms,
primarily its statement of interdiction and ship-boarding agreements, and treat it as a
valid state act in the international community. Doing so is important because the
discussion provides not only clear ideas about the PSI but also guidance for the second
part. The first part also discusses the legal character and identifies any relevant
international legal obligation. The second part frames the PSI in the category of
sources of international law reflected by Article 38 of the I.C.J. Statute. The sources of
international law discussed are treaty and customary international law. The second
part also shows that the PSI, irrespective of its forms, has legal character and reflects
norms recognized as customary international law.

The PSI as a Unilateral Act
First, the PSI is a unilateral act. It was created by states primarily to combat
proliferation of WMD, which the international community recognized as a threat to
international peace and security. This threat is further escalated by the possibility of
terrorists acquiring WMD, which the international community also considers as a
threat to international peace and security. Considering this threat, states that shared
similar concerns agreed to develop an arrangement to suppress such threats. In the
arrangement, the states set political commitments as well as measures to fight the
threats. The measures range from national and international undertakings to the
exchange of information to maritime interdictions.
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Degan argues that the validity of a unilateral act is comparable to that of a

11!1

111

l,'"I

n

1

I11

treaty; that is, it is conducted by states in accordance with international law at their
expressed will and does not require a fixed form. 252 Degan bases his arguments on
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Dionisio Anzilotti's requirements of a legal act recognized by international law. 253 In
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this context, the PSI meets all the requirements of a valid unilateral act. For the first
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and third requirements, PSI members are the ninety-eight states in the world that have
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expressed their commitment publicly under the PSI statement of interdiction. The
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second requirement follows the commitments set out in the PSI statement of
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interdiction, which, as established in the previous chapter, are permissible under
international law in terms of both motives and methods employed. 254 In addition, the
PSI stresses a commitment in its implementation to comply with provisions of national
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and international law.
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With regard to the last requirement, the form, the PSI is close to international
engagements that are usually reflected in declarations. Examples of this type of
11

declaration include the 2001 International Plan of Action on IUU Fishing, the 1970

I'II,
1,1

Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and the
G8 Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Whether this type of
declaration has a binding character is subject to interpretation, which includes analysis
of the parties' intentions, language selection, and circumstances surrounding such a
declaration. The P.C.I.J. held that international engagement may have an obligatory
character:
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V. 0. DEGAN, SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 286 ( 1997).
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Id. at 259.
See Chapter 3, "PSI and International Law," supra.
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From the standpoint of the obligatory character of international engagements, it
is well known that such engagements may be taken in the form of treaties
conventions, declarations, agreements, protocols, or exchanges of notes. 255
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Similarly, the I.C.J. affirmed that declarations may have a binding character to their
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parties:
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It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts,
concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal
obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific.
When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should
become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration
the character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally
required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An
undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even
though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding. In
these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any
subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from
other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such a
requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the
juridical act by which the pronouncement by the state was made. 256
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There are, of course, declarations that merely reflect political concern and the position
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of states and are not intended to create legal binding force. 257 Nevertheless, even if
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these declarations do not have the legal binding force comparable to that of a treaty,
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the I.C.J. indicated this type of declaration might express existing rules of international
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In the case of the PSI, its statement of interdiction principles does have a
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binding character. Although PSI participants claim that it is voluntary in nature, such
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Customs Regime between Germany and Austria Case, Advisory Opinion, 1931 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 41, at 47, para. 35 (Sept. 5).
256
Nuclear Test, supra note 43, at 267, para. 43.
257
See Haya de la Torre Case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, 1951 I.CJ. (June 13), p. 71 for
examples of acts or declarations of comity; see also North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v.
Denmark/Netherlands), Judgment, 1969 l.C.J. (Feb. 20), p. 3 [hereinafter North Sea
Continental Shelf].
258
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
2005 I.CJ. (Dec. 19), at 226, para. 162.
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claims do not necessarily eliminate or weaken the binding character. The selection of
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wording in the PSI statement of interdiction indicates clear intentions and
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commitments. The PSI statement of interdiction not only describes common political
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interests but also includes commitment to actions to enforce such common interests.
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The clear intentions and commitments of the PSI are reflected in the chapeau of the
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PSI statement of interdiction:
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PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to
establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and
stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to
and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with
national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks,
including the U.N. Security Council. They call on all states concerned with this
threat to international peace and security to join in similarly committing to: 259
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Thus, states adhering to the PSI, according to the chapeau, are obliged to follow
'}~

interdiction principles set out therein. Such obligation is expressed in the clear
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declaration adopting the PSI principles of interdiction. This declaration shares similar
characteristics with the PSI, for example, being a unilateral act. For instance, the
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declaration of Colombia agreeing to follow the PSI states:
By adhering to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Colombia expresses
its willingness to work jointly with members of PSI to prevent and stop the
transport of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related
materials. Colombia will devote resources and efforts to interdiction operations
and capabilities within the framework of the Initiative, in accordance with its
national law and national capabilities, and without prejudice of the efforts and
resources that Colombia should allocate to the maintenance of public order and
defense of the institutions against the actions of the illegal armed groups. 260
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PSI: Statement of Interdiction, supra note 19, para. 3.
U.S. Dep 't of State, Colombia Endorses the Proliferation Srity Initiative, May 17, 2010,
available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/05/141921.htm.
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Under international law, the declaration of Colombia binds Colombia as a state to
comply with the PSI. From P.C.I.J. to I.CJ. cases,261 international law confirms that
such a declaration has legal binding force. One may argue that it would be a violation
of principles of good faith and pacta sunt servanda if, after such a declaration,
Colombia did not comply with the PSI statement of interdiction.
Furthermore, when a state adopts the PSI statement of interdiction, it may
participate in the arrangements set out under ship-boarding agreements between the
United States and major flag-state countries provided that the state agrees to follow the
provisions of ship-boarding agreements. 262 Thus, the initially bilateral ship-boarding
agreements might bind a third participating state. Considering the similar frameworks
of the PSI statement of interdiction and ship-boarding agreements, mixed participation
in both instruments is likely to occur. Under such mixed participation, it would be
difficult to distinguish obligations set out by the PSI statement of interdiction from
those of the ship-boarding agreements, further indicating the binding character of PSI
membership.
The PSI under Sources of International Law Framework
The primary sources for the international law framework are international
conventions, customary international law, and general principles oflaw as enshrined
in Article 38 of the I.C.J. Statute,
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly organized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
261

See, e.g., Mavrommatis Palestine Concession Case (Greece v. U.K.), Judgment, 1924
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 19 (Aug. 30); Nuclear Test, supra note 43.
262
See, e.g., SBA St. Vincent and the Grenadines, supra note 6, art. 19.
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c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
These three primary sources have their own binding characters. International
(f
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conventions, for instance, bind only the parties agreeing to the conventions while

,.\7,

:t
customary international law may be binding to all states except those that have
exercised objection persistently, and general principles of law apply to all states
without exception. Within these primary sources, first the I.CJ. normally searches for
a norm in international conventions due to its evidential factor. Doing so, however,
does not mean that international conventions have a higher status than other sources of
international law. There is no hierarchy under I.C.J. mechanisms to indicate primary
sources. In certain cases, a norm can also be included in two sources of international
law, that is, international conventions and customary international law, and thus bind
the relevant parties. One example of such a case is that of the Nicaragua judgments, in
which the I.CJ. affirmed that it
cannot dismiss the claim of Nicaragua under principles of customary and
general international law, simply because such principles have been enshrined
in the texts of the conventions relied upon by Nicaragua. The fact that the
above mentioned principles, recognized as such, have been codified or
embodied in multilateral conventions does not mean that they cease to exist
and to apply as principles as customary law, even as regards countries that are
parties to such conventions. Principles such as those of the non-use of force,
non-intervention, respect for independence and territorial integrity of States,
and the freedom of navigation, continue to be binding as part of customary
international law in which they have been incorporated. (I.C.J. Report 1984, p.
424, para. 73)2 63
The secondary source of I.C.J. mechanisms refers to judicial decisions and
teaching of the most highly qualified publicists. Examples of such a secondary source
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Nicaragua, supra note 43, at 93, para. 174.

105

are decisions of the I.C.J. and the writings of Lauterpacht and Anzelotti. Generally, the
I.CJ. applies secondary sources to determine a norm of customary international law
and general principles of law. Secondary sources function as a subsidiary means for
identifying norms if primary sources fail to do so. This function, however, is different
from that of a requirement of customary international law, that is, opinio juris sive
necessitatis or a sense of legal obligation of a state over an act invoked.
Treaty. Three international instruments related to the PSI are available to the

public: the statement of interdiction, the declarations of PSI participants, and shipboarding agreements. Based on their functions, one may frame the declarations as
representations of the political wills of states that support the PSI, primarily
encapsulated in the statement of interdiction. Similarly, the ship-boarding agreements
serve as complements to the statement of interdiction. Hence, the instrument that is
closest to describing the PSI in its character is the statement of interdiction.
Nevertheless, if one is to consider the binding force of these instruments based on
international treaty law, ship-boarding agreements rank first, followed by the
declarations and then the statement of interdiction.
International treaty law as enshrined in the 1969 Vienna Law of Treaties, the
1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, and the 1986
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or between International Organizations, defines a treaty as follows:
"treaty" means an international agreement concluded between States [or
between one or more States and one or more international organizations or
between international organizations] in written form and governed by
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international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments and whatever its particular designation. 264
According to this definition, the three primary characteristics of a treaty are that the
parties conclude the agreement, it is in written form, and it is governed by
international law. While these characteristics may seem to be ideal elements of a
treaty, international treaty law recognizes the notion that content supersedes form. In
other words, in determining the legal binding force that gives rise to international
rights and obligations, international law considers the contents of an instrument rather
than its form. For example, an instrument may have legal binding character even
though it is not in written form. 265
In terms of procedures, the international community acknowledges two types
of treaty: formal and simplified. Under a formal treaty, all requirements and
{;
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procedures of a formal treaty are met, ranging from consent to be bound to ratification
to termination and settlement of disputes. A simplified treaty, on the other hand, meets
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only certain requirements and procedures of a formal treaty. One of the primary
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differences between the two types of treaties is that a formal treaty needs ratification
and incorporation into national law while a simplified treaty does not. Nevertheless,
this difference does not affect the legal binding character of a simplified treaty. In fact,
in terms of quantity, simplified treaties outnumber formal treaties because of their
simplicity.
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organization
or between International Organizations (Mar. 21, 1986), 25 I.L.M. 543, art. 2(1 )(a) [brackets
added]; 1969 Vienna Law of Treaties, supra note 22, art. 2( 1)(a); Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (Aug. 23, 1978), 17 I.L.M. 1488, art. 2(l)(a).
265
See 1969 Vienna Law of Treaties, supra note 22, art. 3; see also Maritime Delimitation and
Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J.
(Jul. 1), p. 112; ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 44 (2000).

In the context of the PSI, the question lies in whether the PSI, represented by
its statement of interdiction, has legal character and whether such character binds the
states supporting it. Based on the three primary characteristics of a treaty governed by
the 1969 VCLT, the PSI falls under the second type of treaty, the simplified treaty.
First, the initial group of PSI participants-Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United
States--concluded and adopted the PSI statement of interdiction on September 4,
2003, followed by additional declarations and adoptions from more than ninety other
states in the world. 266 This fact satisfies the requirement of states being subject of the
agreement. Second, as established in previous chapters, the PSI does not contradict
international law. Instead, it complements the existing regimes of terrorism and
WMD. It also emphasizes the requirement to comply with relevant rules of national
and international law in its implementation; hence, the PSI meets the requirement of
being "governed by international law." With regard to the form, the PSI takes the form
of a declaration.
As an instrument, the PSI statement of interdiction meets the requirements of a
simplified treaty. It does not, however, constitute a formal treaty governed primarily
by the 1969 Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties. A formal treaty that shares the
concern of the PSI statement of interdiction can be found in the 2005 SUA Protocol.
The protocol, which was adopted by the International Conference on the Revision of
the SUA Treaties on October 14, 2005, and entered into force on July 28, 2010,
currently has twenty state parties. The member states of the protocol consider the
266

See, e.g., G-8 2011 Summit, Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, May 2627, 2011, http://www.canadaintemational.gc.ca/g8/summit-sommet/2011/Annex5DeclarationNon-proliferationDisarmament.aspx?view=d. See App. H for text.

illicit transfer of WMD to be a crime. The protocol functions not only as a revision of
the 2005 SUA Convention but also an implementation thereof.
Another form of PSI motive that meets the requirements of a formal treaty is
reflected in the provisions for ship-boarding agreements. Concluded by the United
States and major flag-state countries, the purpose of ship-boarding agreements is to
stop the flow by sea of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. All these
ship-boarding agreements recognize the widespread consensus that proliferation of
WMD and terrorism seriously threaten international peace and security. In addition,
these ship-boarding agreements follow the PSI statement of interdiction principles.
The formal treaty, in this context, follows the simplified form of a treaty.
Thus, based on the foregoing analysis, it is concluded that international law
recognizes the PSI motive in both the simplified and the formal form of a treaty. The
ship-boarding agreements and the 2005 SUA Protocol take the form of formal treaties.
Under international law, both instruments bind all their member states and give rise to
international obligations to stop the illicit trafficking of WMD. Similarly, in the
simplified treaty form, of which the PSI statement of interdiction meets the
requirement, has a legally binding character and mandates international obligation of
its participating states.
Customary international law. The debates on customary international law,
particularly concerning its context of formation, range from defining and classifying
requirements as state practices and opinio Juris to identifying authoritative tribunals
with the capacity to declare a norm of customary international law. The issues have
been extensively discussed and stretched to such a degree that they have reached the

point at which legal commentators question the very existence of customary
international law as a valid source of international law. For example, in agreement
with many other legal commentators, Goldsmith and Posner doubt the role of
1Bf

customary international law in establishing genuine legal obligation in international
law. 267 They further indicate that customary international law remains a puzzle that
lacks a lawmaker, enforcer, and decision-maker, while stressing that its origin and
content cannot be understood by the international community and generally supports
the interest of powerful nations. 268 Another example can also be seen in the opinion of
Norman and Trachtman, who, while rejecting the view submitted by Goldsmith and
Posner, agree that customary international law has limits and variations in its
effectiveness. 269 This subsection does not add more to the already-extensive debate on
customary international law. It addresses only the basic tenets of customary
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international law, that is, the requirements under Article 38 of the I.CJ. Statute, which
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are applied to show that PSI interdiction is developing into a norm.
Article 38 of the I.CJ. Statute governs the requirements of customary
international law as state practices and opinio Juris sive necessitatis. The statepractices element refers to unilateral acts of states in an international plane, and opinio

Juris is the belief that the state is under a legal duty to carry out its unilateral acts. The
state-practices element alone is not sufficient to show there is a norm of customary
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Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory a/Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1999) [hereinafter Posner]. See also AMANDA PERREAU-SAUSSINE &
JAMES BERNARD MURPHY, THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW 279 (2007).
268
See Posner, supra note 267, at 1114.
269
George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J.
INT' LL. 541, 541 (2005). See also Patrick J. Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International
Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 445, 497 (2000).

international law in play. Opinio Juris functions as a filter to differentiate state
practices with legal character from those without legal character, such as ceremonial
acts, acts reflecting comity, or even acts that derive from reasonable common
practices. 270 The I.C.J. highlights the significance of opinio Juris:
77. The essential point in this connection-and it seems necessary to stress itis that even if these instances of action by non-parties to the Convention were
much more numerous than they in fact are, they would not, even the aggregate,
suffice in themselves to constitute the opinio juris;-for, in order to achieve
this result, two conditions must be fulfilled. Not only must the acts concerned
amount to settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such
a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by
the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e. the
existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio
juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that they are
conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or even
habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are many
international acts, e.g. in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which are
performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only be considerations
of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and nor by any legal sense of legal
duty. 271
In addition to the existence of a subjectiv~ element, customary international law
requires that state practices in the objective element meet several conditions, such as
quantity 272and quality. 273 Variables of these conditions are primarily uniformity,
consistency, time, and number of states. In terms of decisiveness, uniformity and
consistency274 rank first before other variables. If states have practiced a uniform act
consistently, the act may develop as customary international law, irrespective of the
270

North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 257, at 34: The fact that a state practices
equidistance methods in delimitation does not automatically constitute customary international
law.
271
Id. at 44, para. 77. See also Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment,
1958 I.CJ. (Jun. 3), p. 30, para 27; Nicaragua, supra note 43, at 98, para. 184; the S.S. Lotus
Case (France v. Turkey), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 28 (Sept. 7).
272
ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 56 (1971).
273
Id. at 66.
274
See S.S. Wimbledon Case (U.K., France, Italy & Japan v. Germany), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 1, at 25 (Aug. 17); see also North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 257, at 44, para. 77.
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elements of time and number of states. Concerning the time element, the I.CJ. held as
follows:
74. As regards the time element, the Court notes that it is over ten years since
the Convention was signed, but that it is even now less than five since it came
into force in June 1964, and that when the present proceedings were brought it
was less than three years, while less than one had elapsed as the time when
respective negotiations between the Federal Republic and the other two Parties
for a complete delimitation broke down on the question of the application of
the equidistance principle. Although the passage of only a short period of time
is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule customary
international law on the basis of what was originally a purely conventional
rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in question,
short though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests
are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform
in the sense of the provisions invoked;-and should moreover have occurred in
such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal
. . 1s
. mvo
.
lve d .21s
o bl 1gat1on
Similar to the element of the number of states, international law suggests no limitation
qualification.

276

According to this qualification, a norm of customary law does not

have to be universally applicable. Instead, it may be applicable only regionally or
bilaterally.
Besides regional and bilateral application, customary international law also has
exceptions. One such exception is persistent objection. A state that acts persistently
objecting the applicability of a rule may qualify for an exception. The I.CJ. stated that
such qualification was inapplicable to the 10-mile rule because of Norway's persistent
objection:
As has been said, the United Kingdom Government concedes that Norway is
entitled to claim as internal waters all the waters of fjords and sounds which
275

North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 257, at 43, para. 74; see also Ryszard Piotrowicz,
The Time Factor in the Creation of Rules of Customary International Law, 21 POLISH Y.B.
INT'L L. 69, 85 (1994 ).
276
See Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.CJ. (Nov.
20), p. 266; see also Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Merits)
(Portugal v. India), Judgment, 1960 I.CJ. (Apr. 12), p. 6.
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fall within the conception of a bay as defined in international law whether the
closing line of the indentation is more or less than ten sea miles long. But the
United Kingdom Government concedes this only on the basis of historic title;
it must therefore be taken that Government has not abandoned its contention
that the ten-mile rule is to be regarded as a rule of international law. In these
circumstances the Court deems it necessary to point out that although the tenmile rule has been adopted by certain States, both in their national law and in
their treaties and conventions, and although certain arbitral decisions have
applied it as between these States, other States have adopted a different limit.
Consequently, the ten-mile rule has not acquired the authority of a general rule
of international law. In any event then ten-mile rule would appear to be
inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch as she always opposed any attempt
. to th e N orwegian
. coast. zn
to app1y 1t
To make a valid claim of international customary law exception, however, the acts
should always be framed outside the rule being objected. In other words, if the acts are
based on exceptions or justifications derived from the rule, then such acts are
confirming rather than objecting. In the Nicaragua case, the I.CJ. stressed the
following:
The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the
corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the
rules. In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it
sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such
rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should
generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the
recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible
with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or
justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's
conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to
confirm rather than to weaken the rule. 278
i:

Both exceptions, objecting to a rule and state practices confirming a rule, can
manifest in internal and external acts. Internal acts generally are domestic legislation
and judicial decisions while external acts are associated with international
commitments that may take such forms as diplomatic correspondence, declarations,
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Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Norway), Judgment, 1951 I.CJ. (Dec. 18), p. 131.
Nicaragua, supra note 43, at 99, para. 186.

international participation and arrangement, and international agreements. Taking into
account the forms of evidences, identifying a rule of customary international law can
be a difficult task, particularly if the purpose of such identification is to establish a
new rule rather than to confirm an existing one. In the case of the PSI, the task is a mix
of the former and the latter. It involves both because the PSI is derived from existing
rules.

State practice. The foundations of the PSI are the regimes of combating
terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. Based on memberships of international
instruments concerning these regimes, state practices are uniform and consistent. The
international community recognizes any act of terrorism as a threat to international
peace and security. 279 In terms of treaty or convention type alone, there are currently
fourteen universal conventions and four amendments on combating terrorism, besides
regional and bilateral arrangements. Similarly, through international instruments,
primarily the 1968 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, the 1972 Biological
Weapons Convention, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, the international
community commits to prohibition and elimination of WMD. Falling between the two
regimes is the UNSC Resolution 1540, which treats illicit trafficking of WMD as a
threat to international peace and security. Thus, the international community
recognizes the PSI motive.
As of 2011, 193 states were listed as members of the U .N. About eighty
percent of those are members to international instruments on the two regimes.
Concerning terrorism, for example, the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain

1;

Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft has 185 state parties, and the 1999

I
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S.C. Res. 1368,, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2011).
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International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism has 175
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state parties.
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°Concerning proliferation of WMD, the NPT has 190 state parties,
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followed by the CWC with 188 and the BWC with 164. 281 These statistics do not
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include other types of international instruments, such as declarations and strategies.
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Currently, ninety-eight states in the world have committed to the PSI method,
interdiction of illicit trafficking of WMD. This number includes more than 50% of all
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U.N. member states. According to geographic location, Europe ranks first with forty-
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two states, followed by Asia (thirty-two), Oceania (six), the Americas (five), and
Africa (five). These numbers suggest that PSI interdiction is a uniform and consistent

I

state practice on the European continent (forty-two states out of forty-seven) and Asia

i,II[I
I

I

(thirty-two states out of forty-four/ 83 where major shipping lines are located. PSI
interdiction, however, has fewer commitments from Africa (five states out of fiftyfour), the Americas (five states out of thirty-six), and Oceania (six out of fourteen).
These PSI-participating states are also members in the international instruments of the
regimes on combating terrorism and WMD. Based on the number of current PSIparticipating states, on average, at least eight states have committed to the PSI

280

Other examples include: 1970 Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft ( 185 parties); 1971 Unlawful
Acts against Safety of Civil Aviation ( 188 parties); 1973 Internationally Protected Persons
( 173 parties); 1979 International Convention against Taking Hostages ( 168 parties); 1997
Suppression ofTerrorist Bombing (164 parties); and 2005 Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism (77 parties). For status and updates on these conventions, see
http://www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml.
281
For NPT status and text, seehttp://unhq-appspub-Ol.un.org/UNODA/TreatyStatus.nsf; for
CWC status and text, http://unhq-appspub-Ol.un.org/UNODA/TreatyStatus.nsf; for BWC
status and text, see http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc.
282
See, e.g., Declaration on Terrorism by the 8th ASEAN Summit, Phnom Penh, Nov. 3,
2002, available at http://www.asean.org/l 3 l 54.htm; Council of European Union Strategy
Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Dec. 10, 2003, available at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st 15/st l 5708.en03. pdf.
283
For classification of states based on their geographic locations, see World Atlas: Countries
Listed by Continent, http://www.worldatlas.com/cntycont.htm.
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annually since its inception in 2003. With conducive international situations such as
the entry into force of the 2005 SUA Protocol allowing interdiction of the illicit
transfer of WMD in 2010, the number of PSI-supporting states is expected to continue
growmg.
The growing trend of PSI support is not without valid reason. The fact that PSI
practice derives not only from the existing regime of international law but also in
accordance with international law makes it less likely that a state will resist supporting
the PSI. Another factor that creates fewer objections from the international community
is that PSI interdiction hinders the transfer of only suspected cargo. 284 In fact, to date,
all ships stopped under PSI interdiction have only been requested to return to either
their country of origin or a certain neutral port. This practice is consistent throughout
PSI interdiction measures.
Interestingly, the practice of hindering transfer of WMD or any other weapons
has been conducted by states not participating in the PSI. This practice is not new in
the international community, for instance, in the case of Thailand stopping a North
Korean shipment in December 2009. 285 A similar act occurred when India conducted
an investigation of a foreign ship suspected of carrying a cargo of WMD. 286 Another
example of hindering transfer of suspected cargo is South Africa interdicting a North
Korean shipment bound to the Congo. 287 These examples show that the PSI is only a
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See Chapter 3, "PSI and International Law," supra.
See Dan Rivers, Thailand Drops North Korean Weapons Charge, CNN WORLD, Feb. 11,
2010, http://articles.cnn .com/2010-02-11 /world/thai.nkorea. weapons_ l _ north-korea-cargoplane-crew-members?_s=PM: WORLD.
286
See Harmeet Shah Singh, India Intercepts North Korean Ship, CNN WORLD, Aug. 8, 2009,
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/08/08/india.nkorea/index.html.
287
See Christopher Szabo, South Africa Intercepts North Korean Arms Shipment, DIGITAL
JOURNAL, Feb. 23, 2010, http://digitaljoumal.com/article/287974.
285
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form that conveys international concerns already shared and practiced by the
international community.
Opinio juris sive necessitatis. Being a party to international instruments
indicates not only a willingness to be bound but also recognition of that particular
international instrument as law. This indication constitutes evidence of opinio juris as

1

111
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held by the I.C.J. in the Nicaragua case:
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As regards certain particular aspects of the principle in question, it will be
necessary to distinguish the most grave form of the use of force (those
constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms. In determining the
legal rule which applies to these latter forms, the Court can again draw on the
formulations contained in the Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 2625
(XXV), referred to above). As already observed, the adoption by States of this
text affords an indication of their opinio juris as to customary international law
on the question. Alongside certain descriptions which may refer to aggression,
this text includes others which refer only to less grave forms of the use of
force. 288
In the context of the PSI, this author argues that opinio juris indicates that any state act
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preventing the illicit transfer of WMD is derived from a legal obligation. This
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argument stands on three primary premises: legal obligations from treaty or
,.:jl,!·I
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convention, PSI arrangements, and domestic legislation. The first premise has two
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parts, which are primary and secondary treaty legal obligation. Primary-treaty legal
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obligation refers to an international instrument that allows interdiction of illicit

transfer of WMD as a crime, which its state parties are under legal obligation to
prevent. The secondary-treaty legal obligation points to international instruments that
treat illicit transfer of WMD as a crime but do not directly specify interdiction per se
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Nicaragua, supra note 43, at 101, para. 191 (emphasis added).
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as a means to counter the crime, which in this case, is terrorism and proliferation of
WMD.
Primary-and secondary-treaty legal obligation. As of 2011, apart from shipboarding agreements, only one international treaty shared PSI motive and method, that
is, allowing interdiction to prevent illicit transfer of WMD: the 2005 SUA Protocol.
Concluded in 2005, this protocol entered into force in 2010 and as of 2012 has twenty
member states. According to this treaty, member states are under obligation to stop
illicit transfer of weapons of mass destruction. For its twenty member states, the 2005
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SUA Protocol is a law that must be enforced. This condition is conclusive of opinio
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juris of interdiction to prevent illicit transfer of weapons of mass destruction. The fact
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that the 2005 SUA Protocol has entered into force signifies PSI influences on
international law.
For the secondary-treaty legal obligation, the PSI motive shares legal
obligation primarily with regimes of combating terrorism and proliferation of WMD.
A state party to, for example, the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism is under a legal duty to punish the offenses set out
therein. 289 Another example is an obligation of member states not to transfer nuclear
weapons, as enshrined in the 1968 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. 290 In
addition, UNSC Resolution 1540 also indicates legal obligation to prevent illicit
trafficking of weapons of mass destruction. These international instruments that give
rise to legal obligations for state parties evince opinio juris for combating terrorism,

289
290

See Convention on Terrorist Financing, supra note 144, art. 4.
NPT, supra note 88, art. 1.
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proliferation of WMD, and the illicit trafficking of WMD. Opinio Juris for the PSI
motive, stopping the illicit trafficking of WMD, is evident in these instruments.
While opinio Juris is conclusive for the PSI motive, such is not the case for the
PSI method. Under the secondary-treaty legal obligation, the international community
opinion varies concerning legal justification for an act of interdiction. One of the
indications thereof is the fact that UNSC Resolution 1540 does not recognize
interdiction as a means for stopping the illicit trafficking of WMD. Thus, China, for
example, threatened to veto any reference to acts of interdiction. 291 Although China
recognizes the PSI motive, it is not yet convinced of the PSI method. Therefore, one
may assume that, for PSI non-participating states, there is not sufficient evidence of
opinio Juris to argue legal obligation for conducting interdiction to stop the illicit

trafficking of WMD. Nevertheless, with the grave risk posed by WMD terrorism, it is
only a matter of time before the entire international community recognizes a legal
obligation to conduct interdiction to stop it. 292
Indication of the grave risk of WMD is apparent in another instrument under
secondary-treaty obligation, UNSC Resolution 1874. 293 This instrument, to some
extent, shares the PSI method application, which is interdiction by calling states to
conduct vessel inspection on the high seas:
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See Mark J. Valencia, Maritime Security Cooperation: The Politics of the Proliferation
Security Initiative, WORLD POL. REV., Sept. 14, 2010, http://www
.worldpo Iiticsrevi ew .com/artic les/640 I /maritime-security-cooperation-the-po I itics-of-thepro li feration-security-initiati ve?page=3.
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Natalie Klein, The Right a/Visit and the 2005 Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 35 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 287, 329
(2007); see also Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force against Terrorists, 20 EUROPEAN J.
lNT'L L. 359, 379 (2009).
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S.C. Res. 1874, ,r 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009).
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Calls upon all Member States to inspect vessels, with the consent of the flag
State, on the high seas, if they have information that provides reasonable
grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains items the supply,
sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8(a), 8(b), or 8(c)
of resolution 1718 (2006) or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution, for the
294
purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions.
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Furthermore, UNSC Resolution 1874 refers to USNC Resolution 1540 in its preamble,
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indicating significant relations to the PSI motive. Despite the fact that the UNSC

l:1~

intended this resolution for North Korea only, it does recognize interdiction on the
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high seas for vessels suspected of carrying cargo governed by the resolution, similar to
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the PSI method. Moreover, taking into account the form of the UNSC resolution, it
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carries legal obligation for U.N. member states.
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The PSI arrangement as legal obligation. For PSI-participating states, the act
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of interdiction to stop illicit trafficking of WMD is based on their commitments of
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joining the PSI. As established earlier, the PSI arrangement is a simplified form of
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agreement. Qualifications from selection of wording to form suggest a legally binding
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character for the PSI instruments. The PSI instruments consist of the statement of
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interdiction, ship-boarding agreements, and the declarations of commitment signifying
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the legal obligation to conduct interdiction. As a package, these instruments provide
legal justification for PSI-participating states to conduct interdiction. Hence, they offer
conclusive evidence of opinio Juris among PSI-participating states.
For non-participating states, particularly in the shipping industry, the PSI
creates another requirement that must be considered. The shipping industry must now
consider types of cargo falling under the classification of WMD to avoid the risk of
interdiction by PSI-participating states. Furthermore, the shipping industry must be
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selective in offering its services because of PSI restrictions on state and non-state
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actors of proliferation concerns. The ship-boarding agreements concluded between the
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United States and major flag-state countries are indications of opinio Juris that the
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latter enforce PSI requirements for all of their registered ships.
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National legislation of legal obligation. There are three sources for national
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legislation oflegal obligations: the PSI Statement oflnterdiction, the 2005 SUA
1

Protocol, and the Secondary Treaty Legal Obligation. For the first source, the PSI

!11
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statement of interdiction, in its third principle, stresses the commitment to national
legislation in supporting the PSI:
Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where
necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when
necessary relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to
295
.
support t hese commitments.
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Similarly, the 2005 SUA Protocol requires ratification by its member states. In other
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words, the 2005 SUA Protocol has become the law of the land for the member states
because it has been incorporated into their national legislation, hence an indication of
opinio Juris.
Based on international instruments mentioned in the secondary-treaty legal
obligation section, opinio Juris is conclusive concerning the foundations of the PSI
motive, that of combating terrorism and proliferation of WMD. Considering that these
instruments are binding to the state parties and generally should be incorporated into
their domestic laws,

296

it is valid to argue that opinio Juris concerning the PSI motive

is also evident from the existence of such domestic laws. For example, the Australian
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PSI statement of interdiction, supra note 19, 3rd principle.
See, e.g., Tokyo Convention reservation requirements, supra note 133, art. 20; NPT, supra
note 88, art. 9.
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Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991 incorporates the 1963 Convention on Offences and
'W.i

Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft297 into Australian domestic law, as
does the Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 1995, which prohibits the supply or export
goods used to create weapons of mass destruction. 298 Another example is the
Indonesian Act No. 2 Year 1976 that ratifies the 1963 Convention on Offences and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft299 and Act No. 8 Year 1978 that
incorporates the NPT into Indonesian domestic law. 300
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Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991, Commonwealth Consolidated Acts, available at
http://www.austlii .edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cal 99 l l 65/s3.html.
298
Australian Government, Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act
1995, May, 29, 1995, available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A0489l.
299
Indonesian Act No. 2 Year 1976, Hukum Online, Mar. 31, 1976,
http://hukumonline.com/pusatdata/detail/l 9870/node/790/uu-no-2-tahun-1976-pengesahankonvensi-tokyo-1963,-konvensi-the-hague-1970,-dan-konvensi-montreal- l 971.
300
Indonesian Act No. 8 Year 1978, Hukum Online, Dec. 18, 1978,
http://www.batan.go.id/prod_hukum/extern/UU8_l 978.pdf.
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Chapter 6
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Conclusion
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Introduced in 2003, the PSI has developed into a norm of international law.
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The PSI statement of interdiction has gained status as a principle for conducting
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maritime interdiction to stop the illicit trafficking of WMD. As of 2011, ninety-eight
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countries, more than 50% of all countries in the world, have committed to practicing
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PSI. In addition, eleven ship-boarding agreements concluded with major flag-state
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countries have given the PSI access to more than 75% of commercial ships worldwide.
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In the international forum, the PSI has influenced international law, evidenced by the
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passing of UNSC Resolution 1540 in 2004, UNSC Resolution 1874 in 2009, and the
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recent entry into force of the 2005 SUA Protocol in 2010, all of which share PSI
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motives and methods as conveyed in the PSI statement of interdiction. This
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dissertation has shown how the PSI has developed into a norm of international law.
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Chapter 2 included analysis of the PSI in detail, ranging from principles as
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stipulated in its statement of interdiction, declarations of commitment from
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participating states, memberships, ship-boarding agreements, program and activities,
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and selected views from both participating and non-participating countries. That
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chapter concluded that the PSI statement of interdiction serves as a brief guide for the
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scope of its maritime interdiction. It establishes the PSI motive (the deterrence of the
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proliferation of WMD), and treats illicit trafficking of WMD as a threat to
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international peace and security. It also sets the PSI methods, maritime interdiction, to
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address such threats. In so doing, the PSI complies with both national and international
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Chapter 3 discussed the PSI within the framework of international law. It
included analysis of the PSI motive and methods in terms ofrelevant regimes of
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international law: sovereignty, freedom of navigation, combating terrorism,
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proliferation of WMD, and the use of force. In its motive, the PSI complements
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regimes combating terrorism and proliferation of WMD, and in its methods, the PSI
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employs limited use of force and consent of flag-states permissible under regimes of
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sovereignty, freedom of navigation, and the use of force. Of course, concerns arise
about the PSI being politically motivated, for example, in the list of state and non-state
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actors. The practice of its maritime interdictions, however, shows that the PSI remains
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objective and non-discriminatory. In addition, the PSI does not currently seize or
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confiscate cargoes from interdicted ships, returning them to their original shipping
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countries instead.
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Chapter 4 included a comparison of PSI maritime interdiction with other
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maritime interdiction recognized under international law, specifically UNCLOS-based
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maritime interdiction, fisheries, drugs, the 2005 SUA Protocol, and human trafficking.
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The PSI not only follows but also is comparable to UNCLOS-based maritime
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interdiction. Similarly, the PSI resembles other maritime interdictions recognized
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under international law, notably in its reference to the consent of flag states and

,II:
1

111

1111

limited use of force. The PSI requires flag-state consent or other agreed-upon
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arrangements prior to maritime interdiction. In addition, the PSI employs limited use
of force, indicating safeguards as necessary like any other maritime interdiction
governed by international law. As of April 2012, no reports of PSI-conducted
,,,1

maritime interdiction indicate casualties or damages.
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Chapter 5 provided conclusive indication of the PSI status under international
law. In terms of regimes of unilateral acts, the PSI binds its participating states in their
commitments and practices. Set within an international law framework, the PSI fits
into the treaty and customary international law categories. In the treaty category, the
PSI motive and methods are clear in the entered into force of the 2005 SUA Protocol,
as well as the PSI motive shared with UNSC Resolution 1540, regimes for combating
terrorism and proliferation of WMD. In terms of customary international law, PSI
state practices are indicative in the vast network of the ninety-eight PSI-participating
states and their practices both in motive and method.
The opinio Juris, however, is only conclusive in PSI motive. The international
community remains divided on the method of PSI. Nevertheless, the dissertation
submits that there is a strong indication that the international community is gradually
accepting PSI method as a means to counter illicit trafficking of WMD. Such
indication ranges, among other things, from the entry into force the 2005 SUA
Protocol that criminalizes WMD and the conclusion of UNSC Resolution 1874 in
2009 that shares the method of PSI. Based on the foregoing analysis, this author
submits that PSI maritime interdiction to stop the illicit trafficking of WMD has
developed into a norm of international law. This analysis adds, inter alia, PSI
maritime interdiction to lists of international maritime interdiction recognized by
international law.
In general, this dissertation has demonstrated that the PSI including its
maritime interdiction is practiced and recognized by over half of the countries around
the world. Nevertheless, within its limitation, this dissertation does not specifically

125

discuss commercial impacts of PSI and third-state participation in the PSI including
'i,

legal status of such participation under international law. In addition, relevant future
works or projects following up this dissertation may include investigation on possible
trend of non-consensual maritime interdiction under international law and maritime
interdiction from environmental law perspective.
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Ship-Boarding Agreements with the United States
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Agreement between the Government of United States of America and the Government
of Antigua and Barbuda Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials by Sea,
Apr. 26, 2010, KA V 9066.
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Agreement between the Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas and the
Government of the United States of America Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related
Materials By Sea, Aug. 11, 2008, KAV 8618.
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Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Belize Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials By
Sea, Aug. 4, 2005, KA V 7659.
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Croatia Concerning cooperation to suppress the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related
materials, Jun. 1, 2005, KAV 8190.
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Cyprus Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related
Materials By Sea, Jul. 25, 2005, KA V 7228 ..
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Liberia Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related
Materials by Sea, Feb. 11, 2004, KA V 7065 ..
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Malta Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials by Sea,
Mar. 15, 2007, KA V 8327.
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Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands Concerning Cooperation to
Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems,
and Related Materials by Sea, Aug. 13, 2004, KAV 7064.
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Mongolia Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials by Sea,
Oct. 23, 2007, KAV 8288.
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Amendment to the Supplementary Arrangement between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Panama to the
Arrangement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Panama for Support and Assistance from the United States Coast
Guard for the National Maritime Service of the Ministry of Government and Justice,
May 12, 2004, KA V 6074.
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Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Concerning Cooperation to Suppress
the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and
Related Materials by Sea, May 11, 2010, KA V 8951.
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Appendix B
UNCLOS Hot Pursuit, Article 111
( 1) The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when competent
authorities of the coastal State have good reason to believe that the ship has
violated the laws and regulations of that State. Such pursuit must be
commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within the internal
waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial sea or contiguous zone of the
pursuing State, and may only be continued outside the territorial sea or the
contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been interrupted. It is not necessary that,
at the time when the foreign ship within the territorial sea or the contiguous
zone receives the order to stop, the ship giving the order should likewise be
within the a contiguous zone, as defined in article 33, the pursuit may only be
undertaken if there has been violation of the rights for the protection of which
the zone was established. (Article 111)
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Appendix C
2005 SUA Protocol, Article 5, Paragraph 5 (l)(b)
Transports on board a ship: (i) any explosive or radioactive material, knowing
that it is intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause, with or without
condition, as is provided for under national law, death or serious injury or
damage for the purpose of intimidating a population, or compelling a
government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any
act; or (ii) any BCN weapon, knowing it to be BCN weapon as defined in
article 1; or (iii) any source material, special fissionable material, or equipment
or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or
production of special fissionable material, knowing that it is intended to be
used in a nuclear explosive activity or in any other nuclear activity not under
safeguards pursuant to an IAEA safeguards agreement; or (iv) any equipment,
materials or software or related technology that significantly contributes to the
design, manufacture or delivery of a BCN weapon, with the intention that it
will be used for such purpose.
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Appendix D
2001 IAP IUU Fishing, Pt. 1, Para. 2

!!I

The Twenty-third Session of the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI) in
February 1999 addressed the need to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.
The Committee was concerned about information presented indicating
increases in IUU fishing, including flying "flags of convenience". Shortly
afterwards, an FAO Ministerial Meeting on Fisheries in March 1999 declared
that, without prejudice to the rights and obligations of States under
international law, FAO "will develop a global plan of action to deal effectively
with all forms of illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing including fishing
vessels flying "flags of convenience" through coordinated efforts by States,
FAO, relevant regional fisheries management bodies and other relevant
international agencies such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO),
as provided in Article IV of the Code of Conduct."; see also 1995 Fish Stocks
Agreement, preamble, paragraph 5, "Seeking to address in particular the
problems identified in chapter 17, programme area C, of Agenda 21 adopted
by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, namely,
that the management of high seas fisheries is inadequate in many areas and that
some resources are overutilized; noting that there are problems of unregulated
fishing, over-capitalization, excessive fleet size, vessel reflagging to escape
controls, insufficiently selective gear, unrealiable databases and lack of
sufficient cooperation between States.
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Appendix E
1998 U.N. Narcotics Convention, Preamble, Paragraph 4, 9, and 10
Recognizing also that illicit traffic is an international criminal activity, the
suppression of which demands urgent attention and the highest priority;
Determined to improve international co-operation in the suppression of illicit
traffic by sea; and Recognizing that eradication of illicit traffic is a collective
responsibility of all States and that, to that end, co-ordinated action within the
framework of international co-operation is necessary."; see also 2002 Protocol
to UNTOC, preamble, paragraph 1, "Declaring that effective action to prevent
and combat the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air requires a
comprehensive international approach, including cooperation, the exchange of
information and other appropriate measures, including socio-economic
measures, at the national, regional and international levels."; see also 2002
TOC Convention, preamble, paragraph 7, "Deeply concerned by the negative
economic and social implications related to organized criminal activities, and
convinced of the urgent need to strengthen cooperation to prevent and combat
such activities more effectively at the national, regional and international
levels.
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Appendix F
Major Regional Fishery Management Organizations
The thirteen major Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) in
the world are as follows:
AIDCP (Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program)
http://www.iattc.org/IDCPEN G .htm
CCAMLR (Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources)
http://www.ccamlr.org/default.htm
CCSBT (Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna)
http://www.ccsbt.org/site/
GFCM (General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean) available at
http://www.gfcm.org/gfcrn/en
IATTC (Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission) available at http://www.iattc.org/
ICCAT (International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas)
http://www.iccat.int/en/
IOTC (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission) http://www.iotc.org/English/index.php
NAFO (Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation) http://www.nafo.int/
NASCO (North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organisation)
http://www.nasco.int/index.html
NEAFC (North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission) http://www.neafc.org/
SEAFO (South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation) http://www.seafo.org/
SPRFMO (South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation)
http://www.southpacificrfmo.org/
WCPFC (Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission) http://www.wcpfc.int/
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Appendix G
1995 Fish Stocks Agreement:
Basic Procedure for Boarding and Inspection
1. The inspecting State shall ensure that its duly authorized inspectors: (a)
present credentials to the master of the vessel and produce a copy of the text of
the relevant conservation and management measures or rules and regulations in
force in the high seas area in question pursuant to those measures; (b) initiate
notice to the flag State at the time of the boarding and inspection; (c) do not
interfere with the master's ability to communicate with the authorities of the
flag State during the boarding and inspection; (d) provide a copy of a report on
the boarding and inspection to the master and to the authorities of the flag
State, noting therein any objection or statement which the master wishes to
have included in the report; (e) promptly leave the vessel following completion
of the inspection if they find no evidence of a serious violation; and ( f) avoid
the use of force except when and to the degree necessary to ensure the safety of
the inspectors and where the inspectors are obstructed in the execution of their
duties. The degree of force used shall not exceed that reasonably required in
the circumstances.
2. The duly authorized inspectors of an inspecting State shall have the
authority to inspect the vessel, its licence, gear, equipment, records, facilities,
fish and fish products and any relevant documents necessary to verify
compliance with the relevant conservation and management measures.
3. The flag State shall ensure that vessel masters: (a) accept and facilitate
prompt and safe boarding by the inspectors; (b) cooperate with and assist in the
inspection of the vessel conducted pursuant to these procedures; ( c) do not
obstruct, intimidate or interfere with the inspectors in the performance of their
duties; (d) allow the inspectors to communicate with the authorities of the flag
State and the inspecting State during the boarding and inspection; (e) provide
reasonable facilities, including, where appropriate, food and accommodation,
to the inspectors; and (f) facilitate safe disembarkation by the inspectors.
4. In the event that the master of a vessel refuses to accept boarding and
inspection in accordance with this article and article 21, the flag State shall,
except in circumstances where, in accordance with generally accepted
international regulations, procedures and practices relating to safety at sea, it is
necessary to delay the boarding and inspection, direct the master of the vessel
to submit immediately to boarding and inspection and, if the master does not
comply with such direction, shall suspend the vessel's authorization to fish and
order the vessel to return immediately to port. The flag State shall advise the
inspecting State of the action it has taken when the circumstances referred to in
this paragraph arise. (1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 22)
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Appendix H
G-8 Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
Art. 13. We are determined to promote a more concrete approach with regard
to the fight against proliferation through the effective implementation of
multilateral instruments and strong national measures. To fight proliferation
financing, we support the process launched at the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) that will strengthen the financial vigilance of G8 countries in a
coordinated manner. To support U.N. proliferation sanctions, we will bolster
the existing criminal provisions in national legislation and encourage States to
identify as a specific offence the proliferation of WMDs, their means of
delivery and related materials. Such provisions will also target financing and
financial services. To better counteract proliferation, we are committed to
strengthening cooperation in this area among the G8 and with others, where
appropriate, notably by increasing State endorsements of the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) and improving its effectiveness. We will continue to
strengthen our national export control policies and we will exercise vigilance
with regard to access to WMD and their means of delivery proliferation-related
knowledge and know-how. Such actions will be taken to further implement
Resolutions 1540 and 1887, as well as other UNSC resolutions. (G-8 2011
Summit, "Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament," May 26-27,
2011, (emphasis added).
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